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Statutory interpretation is surely one of the most crucial legal questions today and 
has accordingly received considerable attention from academics and judges.  This article 
examines the past analyses with a new perspective and, most importantly, new 
quantitative empirical evidence.  The theory and practice of statutory interpretation has 
been the subject of some excellent academic analyses over the years on which I will draw 
extensively.1 Unfortunately, these analyses have focused almost exclusively upon 
theoretical matters, with little regard for the actual practice of statutory interpretation, 
save for use of anecdotal supporting examples.2 However fine a theory may be, it has 
little real value outside its operationalization.  A theory that cannot effectively be put into 
judicial practice has little value and may even produce perverse consequences.  Empirical 
analysis is necessary to evaluate the operationalization of the theories.  Empirical analysis 
is important in other ways as well.  The theories of statutory interpretation inevitably rely 
upon certain descriptive presumptions that should be empirically tested.
The purpose of the empirical analysis of this article is to answer several very 
important questions that have plagued the academic dispute over statutory interpretation:
1. Do the justices of the Supreme Court faithfully adhere to particular theories of 
statutory interpretation?
2. Which theories of statutory interpretation tend to be favored by particular 
justices of the Supreme Court
3. Do the justices of the Supreme Court reach ideologically preferred results, 
regardless of particular theories of statutory interpretation?
4. Do certain theories of statutory interpretation tend to produce results 
consistent with a particular ideology?
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1 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 
(1989);  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); John F. 
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of 
Authority in Statutory Interpretation:  An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073 (1992); Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”:  Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction,  17 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 401 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (3rd ed. 2001).
2 An exception to this generalization is The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 
000, which undertook an empirical analysis of the relative use of differing interpretive resources throughout 
Supreme Court history).
5. Do certain theories of statutory interpretation constrain justices and prevent 
them from reaching their ideologically preferred outcome?
All of these questions are vital to understanding the theory and practice of statutory 
interpretation in the Supreme Court.  The answer to the fifth question is the primary 
focuse of the article and perhaps the most critical, at least if we believe that Supreme 
Court decisions should be grounded in law, rather than the political predispositions of 
particular justices.
The first section of the article examines the underlying purposes of statutory 
interpretation, as it is difficult to evaluate differing positions with understanding the 
purposes they purport to achieve.  While there has been much debate over the goals of the 
interpretive process, I argue that the most basic and crucial goal is the rule of law and that 
any methods of statutory interpretation must be evaluated in light of how it is applied – as 
a disciplined means of interpretation or as a cloak to further the ideological policy ends of 
the judiciary.  If the interpretive method is but a cloak, it cannot advance the more 
principled ends that it claims to further.
The second section of the article reviews the methodologies of statutory 
interpretation and the critical analyses of those theories.  I examine textualism, reliance 
on legislative intent, and use of the canons of interpretation, all of which have both 
defenders and critics.  The criticisms of the theories commonly invoke the concern for 
ideological judging, as much of the debate has revolved around whether particular 
methods are disciplined tools for interpretation or are simply convenient tools for justices 
who are advancing their ideologies.
The third section of the article reports the quantitative empirical analysis, testing 
the approaches to statutory interpretation.  The study measures the degree to which 
justices voted ideologically and their relative commitments to different theories of 
statutory interpretation.  The ideological and legal variables are incorporated into a single 
multiple regression, to determine if and the degree to which legal principles of statutory 
interpretation can constrain justices from exercising their ideological preferences about 
statutory policy.  The results are significant and contrary to what is commonly claimed.
Textualism showed no power to constrain the justices, while there was evidence that 
principles of pragmatism and legislative constraint were constraining.
I. The Purpose of Statutory Interpretation
Before assessing statutory interpretation, it is vital to understand its purpose.
Practices cannot be evaluated in the abstract, without some end or purpose that they are 
meant to fulfill.  Historically, there has been some dispute between those who believe 
judges should strive to hew closely to their assessment of legislative intent based on all 
available evidence and those who argue that judges should interpret statutes according to 
their internal language and eschew extrinsic indicators of legislative intent.  Today, the 
traditional theories are complemented by those who argue that judges should take a 
pragmatic and consequentialist view when interpreting statutes and complicated by a 
greater understanding of the ideological influences on judicial decisionmaking.  Each of 
these theories calls for consideration of different tools.  Before evaluating those tools, the 
purposes of statutory interpretation must be evaluated.
A. The Theoretical Purposes of Statutory Interpretation
One asserted purpose of statutory interpretation is the assessment of legislative 
intent.  This position views judges as the faithful fiduciaries of the enacting legislature, 
resolving controversies as that legislature would have chosen, had it understoo d the facts 
of the controversies.3 In the early days of our republic, Chief Justice Marshall embraced 
this theory.4  “Most of the prominent treatises . . . invoke the intent of Congress as the 
interpretive guide.”5  Over the intervening centuries, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
this objective for statutory interpretation.6 This legislative agency purpose is often 
associated with the use of legislative history, though that is not an inevitable association.
Many who are truly devoted to legislative intent interpretation rely on what might 
be called “imaginative reconstruction,”7 an approach set forth by Learned Hand, among 
others.8  In this process a judge “should try to think his way as best he can into the minds 
of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to 
the case at bar.”9  This process involves investigation of “the language and apparent 
purpose of the statute, its background and structure, its legislative history (especially the 
committee reports and the floor statements of the sponsors), and the bearing of related 
statutes,” among other factors.10
A common question about the legislative intent objective involves the ability of 
courts to identify and implement the legislative purpose.  Thus, “judges might mistake 
legislative purposes” or “might, by treating statutes flexibly, be purchasing case-specific 
benefits at the price of increased uncertainty.”11  This attempt to discern the legislature’s 
3 See, e.g., The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2388 (suggesting that due to legislative 
supremacy the courts are to act “as faithful agents of Congress”); Democratic Theory and the Legislative 
Process, supra note 000, at 813 (noting that “[i]ntentionalism asks how the enacting legislature would have 
decided the interpretive question facing the court”).
4 See Schooner Paulina’s Cargo v. United States, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 60 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(announcing that it is “the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature”).
5 The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1077.
6 See, e.g., The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000 at notes 22-23 (listing several of the cases that 
explicitly adopt this standard.  
7 Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, supra note 000, at 817.  
Although this discussion is drawn from Posner, he does not currently subscribe to this particular theory of 
statutory interpretation.
8 See generally Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. 
L. REV. 370 (1947).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 818.
11 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 
892 (2003).
intent for resolution of a particular case can be daunting in practice.12 Searching for 
legislative purpose, it is argued, is a futile endeavor.  Even if courts could effectively 
implement legislative purpose, some argue that this should not be the goal of statutory 
interpretation.
Another possible purpose of statutory interpretation is simply the “rule of law,” 
with the “law” based on the language of the text of the statute itself. Those devoted to 
this purpose of statutory interpretation will be disinclined to use the legislative history or 
purpose of the statute and seek to draw interpretative guidance directly from the statutory 
text.  The statutory text is the law, not the legislative history.13 For some, including 
Justice Scalia, the “intent” of the legislature is not the touchstone of statutory 
interpretation, judicial decisions should be limited to the text of the law.   Textualists 
“rejects the faithful agent model and instead adopts a model of courts as autonomous 
interpreters who seek answers to questions of statutory meaning through application of 
the ordinary reader perspective, supplemented by various judge-made rules of 
interpretation.”14 Only the text itself has “gone through the constitutionally specified 
procedures for the enactment of law.”15  Consequently, the argument goes, only the text 
itself is suited to judicial interpretation.  In this view, the legislature’s role is not to enact 
some broad policy intent, its role is to “pass statutes.”16 The only constitutional 
legislative authority of Congress is to enact specific laws, through constitutionally 
specified procedures.
While the legislative agency theory seems especially deferential to Congress as an 
institutional matter, those dedicated to rule of law textualism are arguably more dedicated 
to legislative supremacy.  The statutory text itself, and not legislative history, is the 
product of the full legislature.  The process of seeking out an extratextual legislative 
purpose may depart from the true wishes of the enacting Congress, while relying on the 
text alone might seem a surer guide to the legislature’s intent.
The debate over legislative purpose vs. textualism has lasted for many decades.  
The Supreme Court has intermittently cycled between focus on the two different purposes
12 See Updating Statutory  Interpretation, supra note 000, at 26 (observing that “we cannot sensibly 
determine whether a legislature that drafted a statute regulating ‘vehicles’ in 1875 would want it applied to 
automobiles, unless we can imagine the legislators knowing enough about cars to make a rational 
judgment”).
13 Judge Easterbrook thus emphasized that the “words of the statute, and not the intent of the 
drafters, are the ‘law’”).  Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1988).
14 Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 351, 
351, 353 (1994).
15 Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 416.  See also Updating Statutory 
Interpretation, supra note 000, at 23 (noting that for textualists the unenacted intentions “cannot be 
authoritative because they have not been adopted according to constitutionally prescribed procedures”).
16 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871 (1930).
at different times.17 While either legislative purpose or textualism has become ascendant 
for a time period, neither has knocked out the competing theory.  Although the ends of 
the two theories seem inconsistent, they have coexisted for much of the American history 
of statutory interpretation.  The debate between the two approaches shows no sign of 
imminent resolution.
Yet a third purpose of statutory interpretation advanced in recent years is a 
pragmatic “best policy” standard, sometimes called practical reason.  The pragmatists 
view the judiciary as a partner in the nation’s governance, capable of making independent
determinations of sound policy or even correcting biases in the legislative process.  Thus, 
pragmatism clearly rejects the legislative agency theory of statutory interpretation.
Justice Holmes, in his devotion to legislative supremacy, famously wrote:  “if my fellow 
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them.”18  For the modern pragmatist, this 
conclusion is not self-evident.  Perhaps judges should play a role in protecting the 
citizenry from “going to Hell.”  While pragmatism may be informed by statutory text or 
legislative history, neither is a dispositive source of interpretation, and a pragmatist judge 
will look to the societal consequences of different interpretations before choosing one.19
Contemporary pragmatism is most closely associated with Richard Posner.  He argues 
that our judges may be considered “wise elders” to whom we may entrust discretionary 
judgments.20 Such judges may use their own discretion to adopt a prudent ruling on the 
interpretation of contested statutory terms.21
Employing judges as pragmatic partners in governance has some theoretical 
advantages.  A legislating body can at best create broad and general rules, based on 
17 See Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149 (2001) 
(discussing how interpretive approaches for statutes have cycled over time).
18 I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 249 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
19 See, e.g., Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 412 (arguing that 
interpretation should be grounded on the effect of “improving or impairing governmental performance”).  
In a vivid metaphor of pragmatism:
Congress builds a ship and charts its initial course, but the ship’s ports-of-call, safe 
harbors and ultimate destination may be a product of the ship’s captain, the weather, and 
other factors not identified at the time the ship sets sail.  This model understands a statute 
as an on-going process (a voyage) in which both the shipbuilder and subsequent 
navigators play a role.  The dimensions and structure of the craft determine where it is 
capable of going, but the current course is set primarily by the crew on board.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 (1988).
20 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 11 -12 (1996) 
(referring to appellate court judges as “councils of wise elders” in whom it is “not insane” to entrust 
discretionary responsibility).
21 When a court engages in common law decisionmaking, it asks the question:  “What is the best 
policy choice?”  Martin Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory:  A Response to 
Professor Weinberg, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 857 (1989).  While courts typically do not ask this same 
question in the context of statutory interpretation, at least explicitly, the pragmatists suggest that perhaps 
they should.  
inevitably limited information at the time it acts.22  Courts see those rules in application 
in particular cases and controversies.23  In consequence, judges witness how the law 
works in practice, and where it fails to work.  As litigation proceeds, judges accumulate 
additional knowledge about a law’s functioning, and they also have an institutional 
position enabling them to adapt the law to differing circumstances and, at least in theory, 
optimize its effects.
Some have claimed other institutional pragmatic advantages for judicial 
decisionmaking.  The courts “independence and their deliberative capacities” allegedly 
give them “significant advantages over a legislature that may be influenced by parochial 
interests and is frequently responsive to monetary demands.”24 There are degrees of 
pragmatism.  At the extreme, some have suggested that the judiciary essentially rescind 
statutes that no longer make sense.25  Pragmatism does not compel such a conclusion, as 
judicial rescission of statutes might not be very pragmatic as a general procedural matter.
Pragmatists reject legislative agency theory, which reduces judges to mere 
functionaries and which ignores the great difficulties of discerning particularized 
legislative intents..  Pragmatists may accept or reject rule of law textualism, depending on 
the circumstances and the pragmatic consequences of such an approach.26 For 
interpretive purposes, pragmatists would reject the dispositive rule of any of the 
traditional interpretive theories regarding text or legislative history, though either could 
be relevant.27 Pragmatism does not inevitably conflict with intent or textualist theories.  
A formalist text-based interpretive standard may even be the most pragmatic, once one 
considers the institutional limitations of the judiciary in ascertaining the pragmatic rule 
on a case-by- case basis.28  Such a pragmatic case-by-case approach may be challenged as 
transforming judges into legislators and introducing an “unacceptable amount of 
22 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) (noting that theories of statutory interpretation go wrong “because they 
impute omniscience to Congress”).  Posner notes that “a statute necessarily is drafted in advance of, and 
with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application.”  Id.
23 See, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 439 (observing that the 
“focus on the particular circumstances enables judges to deal with applications that no legislature, no 
matter how farsighted, could conceivably have foreseen”)
24 Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 440.
25 This position was put forward in Guido Calabresi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES  (1982).
26 See, e.g., The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1084 (arguing that
pragmatism does not argue for “abandonment of text” or other interpretive methods but simply adds a 
consideration for the judiciary).
27 See, e.g., The Inevitability of Practical Reason, supra note 000, at 545 n. 68 (noting that the 
“leading proponents of practical reason in statutory interpretation give considerable weight to text, though 
they are skeptical of the plain meaning approach”).
28 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885 (2003).
uncertainty . . . into the interpretive system.”29 A pragmatic approach relies not on 
“deductive logic” but on a “less structured problem-solving process involving common 
sense, respect for precedent, and an appreciation of society’s needs.”30
The above discussion makes clear that pragmatism is somewhat amorphous and 
therefore an uncertain guide to decisionmaking.  By its nature, the theory permits 
considerable judicial discretion. Pragmatism is not clearly associated with any 
interpretive methodology, though some rules might be associated with pragmatism.  The 
rule against absurd consequences, for example, is a longstanding pragmatic standard.  A 
rule giving deference to the legal interpretation of administrative agencies might also be 
associated with pragmatism; such a rule is clearly inconsistent with both legislative 
agency and textualist theories.
While generally concerned a modern theory, pragmatism has traditional 
underpinnings.  American judges have in some sense “been pragmatists when it comes to 
interpreting statutes,” for “most of our history.”31  The legal process school suggested 
that “courts should attempt to ‘make sense’ of regulatory statutes or to treat them as 
would ‘reasonable people acting reasonably.’”32  Reliance on judicial “wise elders” to 
make sense of statutes, as applied to particular controversies, seems closely akin to 
contemporary theories of pragmatism.  As a particular example of pragmatism, Cass 
Sunstein has urged that courts interpret statutes so as to promote consistency and 
coherence among regulatory programs and consider the systemic effects of a given 
interpretation.33
The currently controversial theory of dynamic statutory interpretation might be 
considered a branch of pragmatism.34  In contrast to the other theories, dynamic statutory 
interpretation began as a largely descriptive matter, though it is normative as well.  
Descriptively, the theory suggests that courts will attend to the preferences of the 
contemporaneous legislature and society, not just the preferences of the enacting 
legislature, when interpreting statutes.  Normatively, the theory approaches pragmatism 
in suggesting that judges can and will update statutes with an intelligent adaptation to the 
contemporaneous circumstances, both factual and legal.
29 Id. at 893.
30 Daniel Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:  Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 
45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983).
31 Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 351, 
351 (1994).
32 Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 435.  See also Philip P. Frickey, 
From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 249 (1992) (noting that Hart and Sacks did 
not believe that statutory interpretation should be formalist but “functional and practical”).
33 Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 479-480.
34 See The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1074 (observing that 
“dynamic theories urge that statutory cases be decided on the basis of public values or practical 
considerations”).
Considerable debate has transpired over the proper ends of statutory 
interpretation.  Advocates for the various purposes have argued vigorously.  The 
advocacy, though, has been largely theoretical and, perhaps for that reason, has not 
produced much resolution.  Thesis and antithesis have struggled, with little synthesis.  
The introduction of more pragmatic theories of statutory interpretation has clouded the 
waters still further.  Relatively little of the debate has been grounded in judicial practice, 
though the study of such practice should be crucial to the competing theories.
B. The Significance of Ideological Judging
The theoretical controversy over the purpose of statutory interpretation is 
compounded considerably by the prospect of ideological biases in judicial 
decisionmaking.  Political scientists have done extensive research on these biases. The 
most comprehensive and best known analysis of this effect was by Segal and Spaeth.35
They have extensively studied Supreme Court decisionmaking, using an expansive 
database, and produced empirical results demonstrating the importance of a justice’s 
ideology to decisionmaking.  Indeed, they argue that legal factors “serve only to 
rationalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the Court’s decisionmaking 
process.”36  Segal and Spaeth’s claims are bolstered by considerable additional empirical 
evidence.37 The evidence that judges are at least influenced by their ideological 
predispositions is now compelling, and the effect of ideology is most pronounced at the 
Supreme Court level.  This conclusion has important implications for statutory 
interpretation.
The findings of empirical regularities, characterized as ideological judging, do not 
necessarily yield conclusions about the internal thought processes or intentions of the 
justices.  While ideological decisionmaking may reflect the oft-criticized practice of 
judicial willfulness, it could somewhat more innocently demonstrate nothing more than 
subconscious motivated reasoning.38  The empirical researchers are generally agnostic on 
35 See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth,  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL (1993) and Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
36 THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 000, at 
53.
37 See, e.g., Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts:  A Meta-
Analysis, 20 JUSTICE SYS. J. 219 (1999) (reviewing and reanalyzing dozens of studies finding substantial 
ideological effect on judicial decisions); Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism:  A 
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997) (reviewing political 
science research on ideology and judicial decisionmaking).
38 Motivated reasoning is a subsconscious psychological effect in which individuals perceive 
information as consistent with their preferred conclusions and construct an apparently neutral justification 
for that preferred conclusion.  See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL.  
480 (1990).  Judges are susceptible to motivated reasoning, like any other individuals.  See Lawrence S. 
Wrightsman, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING:  IS PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT? 55-56 (1999) 
(discussing how judges may be subject to motivated reasoning); Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the 
Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 352-354 (2001) (suggesting that 
motivated reasoning has significantly affected constitutional decisionmaking at the Supreme Court).
the explanation for the ideological pattern of outcomes.  If the effect is subconscious, it 
might be restrained by clear legal directives to the contrary.  Even a conscious bias might 
be so constrained.  The key issue is, therefore, what legal principles or methods best 
restrain ideological decisionmaking.39
For some linguistic extremists, like critical legal studies devotees, any attempt to 
constrain judicial ideology is hopeless.  Those who challenge the constraining power of 
language surely carry a measure of truth.  If language were perfectly constraining on 
judges, they would never disagree or dissent and there would be no discernible significant 
pattern to their individual decisions.  However, language may still be relatively 
constraining.  One may dispute whether a tiger is within the definition of “cat,” but few 
could place a dachshund within that definition, even if they so desired.
While some researchers suggest that the law has no effect and perhaps can have 
no effect on Supreme Court rulings, others contend that the law may have an effect and 
ameliorate ideological decisionmaking.40  If legal standards can affect outcomes and 
avoid ideological manipulation of outcomes, it is important to understand what sort of 
standards may have that effect.  The importance of this understanding may be particularly 
important for matters of statutory interpretation.
Many traditional theories of statutory interpretation have at least implicitly relied 
on a presumption that judges are not ideologically biased in their decisionmaking.  Thus, 
once judges accept whether legislative history is an appropriate guide to statutory 
interpretation, the theories presume that they will all apply that guide faithfully and 
uniformly, without being influenced by ideological biases in its application.  The 
recognition that judges may be ideologically influenced guides the proper approach to 
statutory interpretation.  Reliance on legislative history, it has been claimed, is 
particularly susceptible to ideological bias.41  Constraining judicial ideology is one of the 
explicit projects of textualism.42 However, the textualists have produced little actual 
evidence that their interpretive approach constrains willful decisionmaking.
The appreciation of ideology and judicial decisionmaking leads us to a fourth 
fundamental purpose for statutory interpretation rules – the constraint of such ideological 
39 See Political Science and the New Legal Realism, supra note 000, at 326 (noting that only 
empirical research can yield understanding as to how legal requirements actually affect judicial decisions).  
40 See, e.g., Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got To Do With It?  Judicial Behavioralists Test the 
“Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQ. 465 (2001) (critiquing Segal and 
Spaeth’s claim that the law doesn’t matter in the Supreme Court); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002) 
(empirically finding effect of precedents on subsequent outcomes).
41 See Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 923 (suggesting that 
“grandiose analysis of statutory purposes and misuses of legislative history . . . may have served on 
occasion to mask the justices’ imposition of their own policy preferences”).
42 See Updating Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 23 (noting that “textualism attempts to 
prevent the creative judicial lawmaking that can occur when judges consult legislative materials and the 
social context of the statute”).
judicial choice.43  While some component of judicial ideology is not necessarily a bad 
thing,44 the scope of ideological decisionmaking must be somehow cabined.45  Giving 
free range to judicial ideology defeats all of the plausible theoretical goals of statutory 
interpretation.  A judiciary that effects its own ideological ends cannot be a faithful 
fiduciary of the ideological ends of the enacting legislature.  An ideological judiciary will 
not reliably advance the rule of law, because the same law will be interpreted differently 
by judges of different ideologies.  Judicial ideology also undermines pragmatic 
decisionmaking, because the goal of pragmatism is not to aggrandize a particular judge’s
liberal or conservative ideology but rather to reach decisions that broadly benefit the 
society.  Whatever the ultimate objective of statutory interpretation, ideological 
decisionmaking should be constrained.
In the presence of judicial ideology, the optimal method of statutory interpretation 
might be the theoretically “second best” method.  For example, suppose that the 
legislative agent theory of search for intent was deemed the theoretically optimal 
interpretive method.  However, suppose that in practice the use of this method did not 
sincerely rely upon true legislative intent but was only a mask for the judges’ own 
ideological preferences.  Use of the method would fail to advance and could easily 
undermine the goal of the method.  In this scenario, a theoretically suboptimal 
interpretive method that constrained the use of judicial ideology could better approach the 
objective.  Some arguments for textual interpretation make precisely this case, that the 
textual method is a more objective and constraining guide to judicial decisionmaking.
Enhancing the relative constraint imposed by statutes may be the key project of 
theories of statutory interpretation.46 If language has some constraining power, 
textualism might seem the best interpretive approach for avoiding ideological bias.  Its 
devotees claim that that the theory “provides legal certainty, predictability and 
43 See, e.g., The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1120-21 (discussing 
the theoretical illegitimacy of ideological judicial decisionmaking and the consequent need to constrain the 
judiciary).
44 See, e.g., Terry Jennings Peretti, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT  (1999) (arguing that 
ideological influence is an inevitable aspect of judging and that judicial ideological decisionmaking is an 
appropriate extension of the preferences of the President who nominated the judges and the Congress that 
confirmed them).
45 Ideological decisionmaking may be considered incompatible with judging.  See Allan C. 
Hutchison, IT’S ALL IN THE GAME 48-49 (2000) (suggesting that the “constitutional authority and 
prestige of the judiciary depends, at least in part, on the continuing belief by the community, including 
judges themselves, that judges are not simply ideologues but are, in some significant sense, constrained by 
the appropriate legal materials”).
46 See Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 U. 
VA. L. REV. 561, 603 (1989) (contending that a theory of statutory interpretation may “reduce[] the 
degrees of interpretive freedom” of the judiciary); Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process, supra
note 000, at 821 (suggesting that textualism was “perhaps best understood as an attempt to cabin judicial 
discretion”).
objectivity.”47  This result is typically contrasted with the arguably more discretionary 
practice of reliance on legislative history.  Reliance on the “ordinary meaning” of text 
supposedly enables diverse ideologies to reach consensus.48 Indeed, this rationale for 
textualism is often presented and may be the truest defense of the practice.49
Unfortunately, this claim is oft-asserted but never proved.  Some suggest that a “claimed 
reliance on the text often disguises the actual basis for decision, which does not turn on 
text at all.”50
Pragmatism and dynamic statutory interpretation might seem especially 
vulnerable to the effects of ideological bias.  The philosophical notion of pragmatism can 
be neutral ideologically, represented by those from Rorty on the left to Quine on the 
right.51  The ability of individuals to force all sorts of ideological approaches into 
47 The Inevitability of Practical Reason, supra note 000, at 534.  See also The Use of Authority in 
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1087 (noting that for “textualists, constraint in judging can be 
found only in textual sources of authority”).
48 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain 
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231.
49 The overriding significance of this factor is seen from just a partial sampling of the literature.  See
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:  Toward a Fact-Finding Model 
of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1323 (1990) (emphasizing the textualist position “that 
resort to legislative history subverts democratic values by allowing judges to pick and choose from the 
diverse opinions found in much legislative history, and thereby reach result-oriented decisions”); The Use 
of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1086 (noting that textualists “argue that the 
potentially wide array of originalist sources (especially legislative history) gives judges the freedom to 
justify (and hide) any policy decision”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the 
Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87. 92 (1984) (suggesting that even “the best judge will find that 
the imagined dialogues of deceased legislators have much in common with today’s judges’ conceptions of 
the good”); Joel E. Tasca, Judicial Interpretation of the Effect of the Supplemental Jurisdicton Statute on 
the Complete Amount in Controversy Rule:  A Case for Plain Meaning Statutory Construction, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 435, (1997) (referring to the “sort of result-oriented analysis that consulting legislative history 
fosters”); James P. Nehf, Textualism int eh Lower Courts:  Lessons from Judges Interpreting Consumer 
Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 20 (1994) (arguing that textualism “makes it difficult for judges to let 
policy preferences influence their interpretations”); Maxwell O. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralism in 
the Interpretation of Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1439, 1526 (1994) (studying interpretation of securities 
laws and finding inconsistencies exemplifying “the use of legislative history for post hoc rationalization of 
a conclusion reached on other grounds”).
50 Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 508, n.65; William N. Eskridge, 
Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1531 (1998) (contending that “any judge who 
is determined to be willful is unaffected by methodology” and, absent legislative history “can shop 
dictionaries, canons of statutory construction or statutory precedents” to support a preferred outcome); The 
Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism, supra note 000, at 779 (suggesting that a textualist judge “can, in 
many cases, choose a result simply by choosing which dictionary, treatise, or judicial decision to use as a 
source of the ‘plain meaning,’ and by engaging in selective references to statutory and historical context”); 
Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:  Mourning the 
Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 818-819 (1994) (suggesting that 
“rather than disciplining judicial behavior,” textualism may “indirectly condone the use of an unduly broad 
judicialpolicymaking prerogative”).
51 See, e.g., The Inevitability of Practical Reason, supra note 000, at 539 ( noting that “advocates of 
practical reason are a diverse group, both politically and intellectually”).
pragmatism, though, indicates that the theory of pragmatism is not very constraining.  
Pragmatism might be called “playing tennis with the net down,” in its unrestrictive 
nature.  As such, the theory might seem especially susceptible to ideological 
manipulation.  Critics have questioned “its compatibility with the rule of law.”52
Dynamic statutory interpretation has been called “excessively expansive” in providing 
judicial discretion, establishing “the judiciary as a largely unaccountable ruling elite.”53
Ultimately, though, the effect of pragmatic theories of interpretation is an empirical 
question.  It is even plausible that pragmatism might reduce ideological judicial 
decisionmaking, because its policy orientation is more transparent and eliminates the 
judge’s ability to hide ideology behind a neutral principal of choice. 54
Arguably, the contrasting theories about the purpose of statutory interpretation are 
not wholly incompatible.  A judge could be a “pluralist” who chooses the most 
appropriate theory for a particular case.  Such an approach could be the most theoretically 
appealing, as students of the legislative process have suggested that different approaches 
might suit different statutes.55  The theoretical ideal, though, need not be the best 
approach in practice.  The ideal assumes that judges are capable of discerning which 
approach fits which statute, an assumption that may be unrealistic.  In practice, the 
pluralist approach has resulted in “unpredictability and confusion,” as “it has become 
ever more difficult to predict which judge will apply which theory to which case.”56 In 
consequence, some have argued that rule of law values demand that judges settle on a 
particular interpretive regime, regardless of what that regime is.57
The ideal of precise pluralist interpretation also unrealistically assumes that 
judges are perfectly sincere in their devotion to the most accurate interpretation and not 
influenced by their personal ideological policy preferences. The current existence of
pluralist theories about the purpose of statutory interpretation, and their associated tools, 
52 The Inevitability of Practical Reason, supra note 000, at 533.
53 Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, supra note ___, at 806-807
54 See Stephen F. Ross, The Location and Limits of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in Modern 
Judicial Reasoning,  ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002), Article 6 at 3 (suggesting that “a greater 
transparency in judicial analysis is normatively preferred” and that the “ability of judges to willfully 
interpolate their personal policy preferences . . . would be constrained if judges acknowledged” when they 
were considering pragmatic consequences in interpretation).
55 See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:  A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 617 (2002) (reporting survey of congressional staffers 
and concluding that any “monolithic” theory does not reflect the legislative process).
56 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2085, 2086 (2002).
57 See William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term – Foreword:  Law 
as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 67 (1994) (suggesting that “it is not as important to choose the 
best convention as it is to choose one convention, and stick to it”).
are quite convenient for ideologically minded judges.58  The more different tools that 
judges may call upon in interpretation, the greater their discretion.  If a text seems liberal, 
but the legislative history takes a more conservative position, a conservative judge can 
focus on legislative history to reach a conservative result.  When the text is conservative 
and the legislative history liberal, the same conservative judge might emphasize the text.
Hence, the continued controversy itself facilitates willful or ideological judging.
Even if a given theory of statutory interpretation is accepted as the theoretically 
preferred purpose for the endeavor, that conclusion does not resolve the issue of how 
statutes should be interpreted.  While certain purposes are typically associated with 
certain rules of interpretation (i.e., legislative intent with the use of legislative history), 
that association is always presumed, rather than proved.  Textualists may argue that their 
approach is actually more consistent with the furtherance of legislative intent.  The more 
appropriate focus is on the effect of particular rules of interpretation, rather than the airier 
debate over the ultimate purposes of interpretation.  
With the purpose of statutory interpretation and the significance of ideological 
decisionmaking as backdrop, this article will proceed to examine the theory and practice 
of judicial decisionmaking, with a focus on interpretive methods.  Judges may not always 
disclose their ultimate purpose but they do justify their decisions through particular legal 
methods.  The following section analyzes those methods, their justifications, and their 
common criticisms.
II. The Methods of Statutory Interpretation
There are three central potential tools for statutory interpretation.  The first is the 
statutory text itself.  The text-centered approach seeks to glean the answers to litigated 
disputes from the words of the statute itself.  The second approach involves the use of 
legislative history.  In this approach, the text is supplemented by a consideration of 
various legislative materials developed in the course of the bill’s passage, in order to 
discern a legislative intent for the litigated dispute.  The third approach uses canons of 
construction or heuristics for giving meaning to a statute.  Some canons are linguistic, 
akin to the rules of grammar, while others are substantive presumptions.  The three 
approaches are not inherently antagonistic to one another, but the typical statutory 
interpretation dispute involves a question of the relative importance to be placed on one 
or another of the different methods.  This section analyzes the strengths and weaknesses 
of each of those methods.  In the effort to be reasonably concise, the following discussion 
necessarily oversimplifies to a degree but captures the key theories of interpretation and 
the criticisms of each approach.
A. Text
58 See, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, supra note 000, at 563 
(describing the mental process of judges as:  “(1) read the statute; (2) notice that your reading of the statute 
seems best to fine one of the large number of ‘rules of statutory interpretation’ that you are acquainted 
with; (3) tell your audience that in interpreting the statute you followed that rule”).
One leading approach to statutory interpretation is commonly called textualism.
It is common for judges in statutory interpretation matters to claim that they “start with 
the text.”  Strong textualists might also finish their analysis where they started, with the 
text.  The text-centered approach generally depends on the ability to resolve interpretive 
disputes from words within the four corners of the statute itself.  Although it is 
impossible to eschew all extrinsic evidence, textualism plainly rejects consideration of 
the legislative record for interpreting statutes.59  The controversy over textualism revolves 
primarily around the issue of whether this objective is a realistic one.
1. The textualist approach
Before all else, the traditional theory of statutory interpretation typically begins 
with the statutory text.  The judicial interpreter first looks to see if that text has a “plain 
meaning” that is clear.60  The Supreme Court long ago declared that when “the language 
of an enactment is clear . . . the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of 
the meaning intended.”61  In determining whether the meaning of the statutory text is 
plain, a judge may rely simply on the common understanding of the language of the text 
and use sources such as dictionaries to discern the meaning of the words of the statute.
Even textualists realize that statutory words may lack a plain meaning and that 
they may be ambiguous, at least in the context of the particular controversy before a 
court.  A word’s dictionary definition typically contains more than one possible 
definition.  Discerning the appropriate definition requires some consideration of context.  
The “free exercise” of religion is not about weight rooms.  Consequently, even textualists 
realize that the statutory language must be considered in context.62 Reliance on context 
might seem problematic for textualists, because context is external to text itself.  This 
problem can be consistently resolved, though, insofar as the textualist relies on the text to 
provide the necessary context.
Textualism does not deny the possibility of linguistic ambiguity and can go 
beyond the mechanistic consulting of dictionaries for definitions.  The “whole act rule” is 
a textualist recognition that context is crucial to the appreciation of a text’s meaning.  As 
Learned Hand poetically put it:  “Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have 
only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the 
other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are 
59 See, e.g., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism, supra note 000, at 750 (describing 
textualism as referring to the “use of a different set of tools, including dictionary definitions, rules of 
grammar, and canons of construction in an effort to derive the putatively objective meaning of the statutory 
word or phrase”).
60 For discussions of the “plain meaning rule,” see David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565 (1997); Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning, 
45 VAND. L. REV. 715 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function 
of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231.
61 United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929).
62 See, e.g., Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process, supra note 000, at 820 (describing how 
textualists don’t rely entirely on statutory language but consider the context of the statutory provision).
used.”63  A renowned textualist such as Justice Scalia exhibits a “broad commitment to 
understanding the statute in ‘context’” as part of interpretation.64
The “whole act rule” contains various subsets of interpretive rules.  For example, 
the rule counsels that the entire statute be read as a unified piece, which means that the 
title of a section casts light on the interpretation of the words within that section.65
Another principle of the whole act rule is that the language of a section will be read in the 
context of the full statute.  Language that might have a plain meaning in isolation might 
take on another meaning when other portions of the law are considered.  This principle 
also counsels that statutory provisions should be interpreted in a way so that they do not 
conflict or create inconsistencies with other sections of the statute.  Other aspects of the 
rule are a presumption of consistent usage of language throughout a statute and a 
presumption against interpretations that would derogate other provisions.66
Perhaps the most commonly used principle of the whole act rule is the rule against 
surplusage.  A given interpretation of statutory language might render another section of 
the same statute superfluous.  The rule against surplusage presumes that Congress does 
not insert unnecessary, redundant language in its statutes.  It has been called a “cardinal 
rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely 
redundant.”67  Consequently, if an interpretation makes other language unnecessary 
surplusage, the courts conclude that the interpretation is incorrect and seek an 
interpretation that preserves some independent meaning for all parts of a statute.
A traditional standard for statutory interpretation that departs from textualism, yet 
remains a part of the textualist theory, is the absurdity doctrine.  When the 
straightforward application of statutory text would create absurd results, judges may 
disregard that application and render a non-absurd interpretation.  The Court has 
consistently reaffirmed the “legitimacy” of the absurdity doctrine, but only “infrequently 
invoked” it.68
The absurdity doctrine presumes that when the text seems to call for an outcome 
that “sharply contradicts commonly held social values,” the Congress could not have 
intended such an outcome, and the text simply “reflects imprecise drafting that Congress 
could and would have corrected had the issue come up during the enactment process.”69
This theory, though, relies on the faithful agent theory and contradicts some textualists’ 
position that courts apply statutes rather than legislative intent.70  Nevertheless, the use of 
63 NLRB v. Federbush, Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2nd Cir. 1941).
64 Karkkainen, supra note 000, at 403.
65 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 831-833 (reviewing this 
application of the whole act rule).
66 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 833-836.
67 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
68 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2419.
69 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2388.
70 See infra at _____.
the absurdity doctrine “has flourished even during the most textually oriented periods of 
the Court’s history.”71  The doctrine might be seen as creating an escape valve for the 
limited number of cases when pure textualism obviously produces absurd results and 
represent a small bow to pragmatism by the textualists.  The absurdity doctrine is an 
exception, though, and not commonly deployed by the textualists.
2. The critique of textualism
The primary critique of exclusive reliance on text centers on linguistic 
indeterminacy.  When interpreting the meaning of a text, it seems logical to begin with its 
plain meaning.  Yet this approach has been called a “fallacy.”72  The meaning of 
language depends upon its context.  Yet opening the interpretation to consideration of 
context inevitably goes beyond the text itself.  Textualism and the plain meaning doctrine 
thus contain an inherent loophole that can be destructive of the theories’ aims.
The indeterminacy of all language has been extensively debated in the legal 
literature, often by critical legal theorists.  These “crits” contend that language has no 
inevitable intrinsic meaning, so that a text can never dictate a particular interpretation.
Their position finds ample support in philosophical language theory, which demonstrates 
that words have no intrinsic meaning.73  The meaning of text will inevitably vary “across 
different interpreters and in different contexts.”74  The text itself has no meaning, absent 
the context of its interpreter.75 If textual language is so indeterminate, it cannot dictate 
judicial outcomes with any rigor.  Judges who believe otherwise are simply fooling 
themselves.76
The indisputable presence of some indeterminacy, though, does not imply that 
language is utterly indeterminate.77  Claims that statutory language is indeterminate have 
71 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2388.
72 Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 262 (1990).
73 See, e.g., H. G. Gadamer, TRUTH AND METHOD (J Weinsheimer & D. Marshall trans. 2d rev. 
ed. 1989); Georgia Warnke, GADAMER:  HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION AND REASON (1987) 
(discussing hermeneutic theory).
74 William N. Eskridge, Jr. Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 625 
(1990).
75 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 801 (applying the 
theories to statutory interpretation and urging that a text has no meaning until it is interpreted and that 
interpretation is entirely a creature of the interpreter himself or herself and the historical context).
76 See, e.g., Jerome M. Balkin, Taking Ideology Seriously:  Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique, 
55 UMKC L. REV. 392, 426 (1987) (noting critical position that judges “suffer from false consciousness, 
and that the law thus subconsciously reflects the ideological biases of the judges, even as they believe they 
are following the law”).
77 See IT’S ALL IN THE GAME, supra note 000, at 209 (noting that a “dismissal of foundationalist 
jurisprudence does not commit the critic to such a bleak antifoundationalist stance in which adjudication is 
reduced to a conniving or insincere exercise in ideological manipulation”).
been called “wildly overstated.”78  Language is “not radically indeterminate” because it 
has a meaning fixed by communities.79  Words do have meanings within particular 
language communities.  Textualists need not claim that words have some abstract 
meaning but merely that “statutes convey meaning . . . because members of a relevant 
linguistic community apply shared background conventions for understanding how 
particular words are used in particular contexts.”80  Even the “strictest modern 
textualists” recognize the potential indeterminacy of language, but this does not itself 
dejustify the approach.81  The critique of textualism may simply reflect an assault on a 
straw man.  The approach may be more determinate than the alternatives. Even strong 
textualists, such as Justice Scalia, have expressly recognized that statutory interpretation 
is not textually mechanistic and requires “a certain degree of discretion.”82  Arguably, the 
extent of this discretion under textualism is less than the discretion enabled by other 
interpretive approaches.  Even if textualism cannot dictate one certain and true meaning 
for statutory language, it may have a constraining effect by ruling out numerous arguable 
meanings.
Dan Farber stresses that even pure textualism is not a “mechanical task” and 
questions the extent to which textualism disciplines judicial statutory interpretation.83
Deciding the meaning of language for complex statutes passed in a particular context 
“requires a good deal of judgment (not to mention expertise).”84  The cases that reach the 
Supreme Court are not usually the easy ones, where the plain meaning of terms is 
obvious.85  Consequently, the value of textualism as an interpretive methodology at the 
district court level may not translate into Supreme Court decisionmaking.  The Court may 
by its nature hear only the cases where the text does not answer the question being 
litigated.  One need not embrace the radical indeterminacy of the crits to question 
textualism.  Segal and Spaeth have persuasively noted:
. . . construction through plain meaning possesses a chameleonic quality 
that spans the color spectrum.  First, English as a language lacks precision.  
Virtually all words have a multiplicity of meanings, as the most nodding 
acquaintance with a dictionary will attest.”  Meanings, moreover, may 
directly conflict.  For example, the common legal word “sanction” means 
to reward as well as to punish.  The penumbral quality of a given word, 
78 Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 441.
79 Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity and Authority, in LAW AND 
INTERPRETATION:  ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 203, 222 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
80 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2458.
81 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at note 29.
82 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83 The Inevitability of Practical Reason, supra note 000, at 547.
84 Id. at 547-548.
85 Id. at 549.
especially in combination with others, insures wide-ranging discretion by 
those charged with construing the overall meaning of the pertinent set of 
words.  Second, legislators . . . typically fail to define their terms . . . 
because of the need to effect a compromise . . ..  Third, one statutory or 
constitutional provision or court rule may conflict with another.  And 
while some language may be clearer than others, the meaning of words 
under construction in the types of cases heard by the Supreme Court . . . is 
likely to be particularly opaque.  Fourth, identical words in the same or 
different statutes need not have the same meaning.86
To this list might be added the problem of a statutory gap or interstix where, by 
definition, there is no text to resolve the interpretive question.  All these features of 
textualism lessen its disciplining rigor and call into question the theory’s ability to 
produce definitive statutory interpretations.87
It might seem that the difficulties of textualism could be ameliorated with the 
obvious and seemingly mechanical means for discerning the meaning of terms by 
consulting a dictionary.  The purpose of dictionaries is defining words, and dictionaries 
would seem to be an unbiased source and logical resource for textual interpretation.88
Textualists on the Supreme Court have embraced the use of dictionaries in an “almost 
fanatical” fashion.89  Yet the authors of dictionaries caution that meaning is dependent on 
context and that a dictionary definition cannot determine the “correctness” of an 
interpretation.90  Even textualists acknowledge this limitation of dictionaries, that the 
meaning of words requires an appreciation of their context.91  Even absent the contextual 
problem, dictionaries are not necessarily reliable guides to the meaning of words92 and 
86 THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 000, at 
54.
87 The difficulties of relying on text and plain meaning is increasingly recognized in the analogous 
field of contract interpretation.  See Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation:  The 
Search for Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REV. 643 (1995) (discussing the demise of the 
plain meaning rule in contract interpretation).  Extrinsic evidence on contract meaning may be considered, 
even when the words of the contract do not seem ambiguous.  Id. at 649.
88 See Note, Looking It Up:  Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 
(1994) (discussing use of dictionaries as part of textualist movement and increased use of dictionaries over 
time).
89 Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Review of Agency Action:  The Problems of Commitment, Non-
Contractability and the Proper Incentives, 44 DUKE L.J. 1133, 1143 (1995).
90 Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:  Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 275, 285 (1998)
91 See Chison v. Roemer, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (referring to the 
controlling principle as “ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context”).
92 Id. at 292 (observing that dictionaries are selective in their definitions and have a class bias that 
does not reflect “ordinary language”).
they may differ among themselves.93  They unavoidably have “a limited capacity to 
record the nuances of usage.”94  The limits of reliance on dictionaries are compounded by 
the existence of numerous dictionaries, containing different definitions, and enabling 
“dictionary shopping” for convenient definitions..95
The whole act rule does not cure the difficulties of purely textual interpretation.  
This rule, a facially logical approach to interpretation, has also been questioned as 
unrealistic.  The rule that every word should have meaning and that statutes should be 
interpreted to avoid surplusage does not conform to ordinary usage.  Redundancy may 
exist for a variety of reasons, including giving emphasis to a point.  Posner notes that “a 
statute that is the product of compromise may contain redundant language as a byproduct 
of the strains of the negotiating process.”96  Other aspects of the whole act rule may also 
reflect an unreasonable view of the legislative process.97  If interpreted as weak rules, or 
guidelines, the principles behind the whole act rule are surely logical ones.98 Of course, 
as a weak rule, it offers much less benefit as a rule for resolving the difficult cases that 
come before the Court.
Textualism is not so simple as it might appear and not easily executed, but its 
defenders stress its virtue of neutrality.  They contend that textualist interpretation is less 
susceptible to ideological manipulation than is consideration of legislative history.  This
contention is unproven, however.  Text may just as readily manipulable as legislative 
history.  Or textualism may even be worse in this regard.  Tom Merrill suggests that 
reliance on textualism “tends to make statutory interpretation an exercise in ingenuity –
an attitude that may be less conducive to deference to the decisions of other institutions 
than the dry archival approach associated with intentionalism.”99  Statutory language has 
been called “the wiggliest of legal creatures”100 and as such can admit of widely varying 
93 Id.  Consider the decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 
515 U.S. 687 (1995).  The case involved the definition of “take,” as part of a list of prohibited terms.  The 
majority opinion cited multiple dictionaries supporting its broad definition.  Id. at 697-698.  The dissent 
cited other dictionaries in support of its narrower definition.  Id. at 717.
94 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2459.
95 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990) (in which the majority relies on Black’s Law 
Dictionary to support their conclusion, while the dissenters rely on the contrary definition in Websters to 
support their position).
96 Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, supra note 000, at 812.  See 
also CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 833 (suggesting that the rule 
against surplusage is “at odds with the legislative drafting process”).
97 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 846 (suggesting that 
expectations of internal coherence and absence of “accidents” in legislative drafting are unrealistic).
98 The Supreme Court took this approach in Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 258 (2000), writing that 
“as one rule of construction among many, albeit an important one, the rule against redundancy does not 
necessarily have the strength to turn the tide of good cause to come out the other way”).
99 Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, supra note 000, at 354.
100 From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat, supra note 000, at 258.
interpretations, even absent any consideration of extrinsic factors.  If so, the greater 
candor associated with pragmatic theories might actually constrain ideological 
decisionmaking.101
While textualism has met considerable disfavor in many theoretical academic 
commentaries, it remains appealing to judges.102  Perhaps a plain meaning rule has 
practical value.  Whatever its theoretical limitations, the plain meaning rule may still be a 
useful “evidentiary rule of thumb.”103  Although language is never perfectly 
indeterminate, alternative sources of interpretive guidance may be “more uncertain.”104
Thus, it is asserted that when “judges stick faithfully to the meaning of words as an 
ordinary reader would understand them, they have less opportunity to write their own 
proclivities into legislation.”105  This is an empirical matter, though.  One can assert that 
textualism constrains judges to a relatively more determinate outcome, but one can 
counterassert that textualism simply provides an especially useful beard for whatever 
outcome the judge prefers.106
Empirical research is necessary to evaluate the claims of the textualists.  Sunstein 
and Vermeule emphasize the critical importance of such research in evaluating 
interpretive methods.107  Ironically, though, they continue to assert that formalistic text-
based interpretation is more determinate than alternative methods, without so much as a 
whiff of empirical grounding.  They imply the existence of cases “in which courts have 
used background purposes, not to make sense of the law, but to impose their own views 
about sound policy.”108  Yet they raise no comparable challenge to textualism and instead 
assume that it restrains the discretion of courts.109  This assumption needs to be 
101 See The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1083 (lauding the value of 
the candor of this approach).
102 Judges have occasionally clearly rejected textualism, however.  Even when language seems clear, 
some would argue that it need not necessarily be followed.  In 1940, the Supreme Court announced that 
extrinsic sources should be used in statutory interpretation “however clear the words [of the statute] may 
appear on ‘superficial examination.’”102  United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-
544 (1940).
103 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2398.
104 Id.
105 Kent Greenawalt, LEGISLATION:  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 219 
(1999).
106 For example, Laurence Tribe is “dubious” that legislative history is any more manipulable than the 
“plain meaning of a text.  A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 74.
107 See Interpretation and Institutions, supra note 000, at 971-919 (discussing the relevant questions 
in evaluating formalism and the need for empirical evidence on the answers).
108 Id. at 919.
109 See Richard A. Posner, Reply:  The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952 (2003) (complaining of Sunstein and Vermeule’s “empirically 
ungrounded praise for judicial formalism”).
empirically tested as well.  Textualism might be just as amenable to ideological 
manipulation as other theories of statutory interpretation.
B. Legislative Intent
Typically juxtaposed against textualism is the reference to legislative intent for 
interpretation.  The textualists do not universally reject the consideration of legislative 
intent in statutory interpretation, they simply argue that the text is the most (or only) 
reliable evidence of this intent.  This is sometimes called “objectified intent.”110  Such 
objectified intent does not necessarily consistent with the actual intent of the enacting 
legislators.  Holmes explained this concept of objectified intent when he declared:  “We 
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”111  Justice 
Scalia has rephrased this as:  “Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ 
intentions.”112  The textualists generally do reject theories that go beyond this objectified 
intent to discern the legislature’s intentions, such as the consultation of the legislative 
record compiled in the process of statutory enactment.  It is the latter resort to legislative 
history that distinguishes legislative intent as an approach to statutory interpretation.
1. The legislative intent approach
Proponents of legislative intent seek to recreate the legislature’s intention in order 
to resolve a particular statutory dispute.  The interpretive approach generally associated 
with legislative intent is consultation of the legislative history associated with a statute’s 
passage.  A court may examine the reports of committees or other legislative materials to 
clarify the statutory text or elaborate it.  The legislative process consists of numerous 
materials, of varying types, and use of legislative history has evaluated the relative 
importance of each.
Among the various sources of legislative history, there is an established hierarchy 
of importance.113 Committee reports generally, and conference committee reports in 
particular, are typically regarded as the most authoritative sources of legislative history 
for the discernment of legislative intent.  In the vast majority of cases, a bill reaches the 
floor of a house of Congress only after being amended and approved in a committee and 
110 See A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 17 (discussing this concept of 
objectified intent).  See also The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2486 n. 258 (providing theoretical 
argument for use of objectified intent).
111 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
112 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (Scalia, J. concurring).  Scalia has 
elaborated by noting that the court’s task is not “to plumb the intent of the particular Congress that enacted 
a particular provision” but instead to “give fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States 
Code.”  Pennsylvania Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Laurence Tribe has 
agreed with this conclusion, noting that “thoughts and beliefs can never substitute for what was in fact 
enacted as law.”  See A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 65.
113 See, e.g., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 302-304 
(describing this hierarchy).
in tandem with a committee report explaining the bill.  As one might expect from the 
most authoritative source, committee reports are also the primary source of legislative 
history utilized by courts.114
Other potential sources of statutory legislative history include floor debates or 
hearings on a bill.  These are generally granted less persuasive impact than provided to 
committee reports.115  Statements by a bill’s opponent may be especially unpersuasive, 
but statements by a bill’s drafter or sponsor are given greater respect.116  A statement 
interpreting the bill made by an opponent is given relatively less credence.117  Other 
aspects of the legislative process may also be examined in the search for legislative 
intent.  The explicit rejection of particular language in a proposed amendment can be 
used as evidence that Congress did not desire that the bill contain such a provision.
More controversial sources of legislative intent involve post-enactment 
developments.  Post-enactment legislative history may include declarations by legislators 
that a court decision “got it wrong” or “got it right,” oversight hearings on the 
implementation of statutes, or subsequent legislative action related to prior judicial 
decisions.118 The conventional theory calls for generally disregarding such post-
enactment legislative history, because it cannot represent the state of mind of the enacting 
Congress.  The Court has inconsistently adhered to the conventional theory and 
sometimes considered this subsequent post-enactment legislative history.119  The 
conventional theory is more amenable to consideration of such post-enactment legislative 
history when it arises in the context of the reenactment of a statute (so that the post-
enactment legislative history is in a sense the enacting Congress), especially the explicit 
rejection of a proposal that would alter prior precedents in a particular way.
When past courts have established a record of a certain interpretation, and the 
legislature has apparently acquiesced in that interpretation by failing to correct it, a later 
court may find this acquiescence evidence that the earlier interpretations were the correct 
114 See Jorge Carro & Andrew Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories:  
A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1992) (finding that over sixty percent of the 
Supreme Court’s citations to legislative history were to committee reports).
115 See, e.g., Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:  Dipping into Legislative History, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1132-32 (1983) (critiquing reliance on these sources).
116 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 997 (suggesting that the 
“statements by sponsors are given such deference in part because the sponsors are the most knowledgeable 
legislators about the proposed bill and in part because their representations about the purposes and effects 
of the proposal are relied upon by other legislators”).
117 See, e.g., Shell Oil Company v. Iowa Department of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 284 (1988) (observing 
that the “Court does not usually accord much weight to the statements of a bill’s opponent”).
118 See, e.g., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 1017-1020 
(summarizing post-enactment legislative history).
119 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331, 402 (1991) (observing that “the Court sometimes consults legislators’ post-enactment 
legislative history statements about the statute” but seems to do so “arbitrarily”).
one.120  If an administrative agency or a court has adopted a particular statutory 
interpretation, and Congress has done nothing in response to that interpretation, the 
legislative inaction may be viewed as acquiescence in the accuracy of the interpretation.  
The court may presume that, had it misinterpreted the legislative intent, the Congress 
would have corrected the mistaken judicial interpretation with new legislation.  Because 
of the congressional inaction, prior statutory rulings are given “heightened stare decisis 
effect.”121  This principle has greater force when the legislature has reenacted or amended 
the statute in question but not altered the record of judicial interpretation.122  The 
presence of subsequent legislative action provides evidence that the legislature did not 
merely overlook the judicial interpretation but more affirmatively embraced it.
Another related interpretive method for statutes involves discernment of the 
general “legislative purpose” underlying the legislation and applying it to the case facts at 
hand.123  While legislative purpose does not inherently require analysis of legislative 
history, but may be gleaned from the circumstances surrounding the legislation’s passage 
or even from the text itself, the reference to “purpose” is still a means of going beyond 
straightforward textualism and getting to legislative intent.  Consideration of legislative 
purpose is thus an intent-based interpretive rule.  A court may choose its statutory 
interpretation based on the rule that seems to best fit the purpose of the Congress when 
enacting the legislation.
Of these various means to ascertain the intent of the legislature, the greatest 
contemporary controversy in statutory interpretation involves the use of the legislative 
history to ascertain the legislative intent.  While the reference to legislative intent in 
statutory interpretation has a considerable historical pedigree, that fact has not dispelled 
the controversy.  Use of legislative history to ascertain legislative intent to guide statutory 
interpretation is challenged at a purely theoretical level but also criticized for its 
pragmatic effects, including its facilitation of ideological judicial decisionmaking.
2. The critique of legislative intent
120 See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 AV. L. REV. 
1, 76-78 (2001) (addressing the “relevance of legislative acquiescence” in judicial statutory interpretations).
121 LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 280.
122 See, e.g., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 18 
(describing how the “reenactment rule is like heightened stare decisis in that it creates a strong presumption 
that authoritative constructions of a statute become tightly bonded to the test and ought not e overruled by 
the Court”); Michael A. Szkodzinski, An Analysis of the EEOC’s Issuance of Early Right-To-Sue Letters:  
Does It Promote Judicial Efficiency or Encourage Administrative Incompetence?, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 689,  
(2001) (observing that “the legislative reenactment doctrine – the absence by Congress to overturn 
regulations that its members are presumed to be aware of – is often relied upon in tax cases”).
123 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 220-223 (2000) (addressing “purposivism” in statutory interpretation);
The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2450-51 (discussing use of legislative purpose in statutory 
interpretation).
At a theoretical level, some have questioned whether legislative intent has 
any meaning at all.  The legislature is a “they,” not an “it.”124  Aggregation of the 
intentions of a multimember body is a difficult, if not impossible, task.125  In addition, 
social choice theorists have conclusively demonstrated that the legislature may have no 
purpose and the statute may have been a product of procedures rather than substantive 
preferences.126  As a consequence, the “final outcome may represent only one of many 
possible majority outcomes,” making it difficult to draw conclusions about legislative 
intent.127 It can be difficult to determine (a) if a given position had majority support and 
also (b) if the majority support for that given position was translated into a legal 
command.
While this general theoretical criticism of the coherence of reference to legislative 
intent has received considerable academic attention, it has not been a primary feature of 
the general critique of reliance upon legislative history, though, and for good reason.  The 
theoretical argument only establishes that there may be no clear majority legislative 
intent.  Nothing in the theory disproves the possibility that a majority of the legislature 
does have a clear and discernible intent.  For the theory to be a true critique, its adherents 
would need to demonstrate empirically that the legislature commonly has no majority 
intentionalist position on the interpretation of a statute for the facts of contested cases, 
and they have not even attempted to do so.  Moreover, the coherence critique actually 
counsels for greater use of legislative history.  Consulting the details of the legislative 
history would seem to be the most reliable means for ascertaining whether the legislature 
did have a true majoritarian intent on a particular disputed issue.
The basic principles in support of textualism argue against reliance on legislative 
history specifically and, at least sometimes, legislative intent more generally.  This 
criticism generally does not focus on the relative theoretical coherence of legislative 
intent but rather draws upon the practical implications of use of intent and legislative 
history.  Judicial use of legislative history is criticized as relying on an inaccurate source 
of intent.  It is criticized as relying on an illegitimate source of intent, because the 
124 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”:  Legislative History as Oxymoron, 
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (arguing that one cannot discern a general preference from the 
multiple preferences of legislators); Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process, supra note 000, at 
824-825 (discussing textualist criticism that it is impossible to translate the preferences of individual 
legislators into a coherent collective choice of the legislative body as a whole).
125 Of course, when the members of a legislative body were in relative consensus, one might 
realistically speak of a group’s intention.  See Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental States Relevant for Statutory 
and Constitutional Interpretation, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1609, 1627 (2000).  The frequency of such 
consensus, though, and its presence in particular disputes, is unclear.
126 This principle is typically known as “Arrow’s Theorem.”  
Judge Easterbrook has emphasized the significance of the principle in statutory interpretation, against use 
of legislative purpose.  See Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-548 
(1983).  He argues that “[a]lthough legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it 
turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice.”  
Id. at 547.
127 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2413.
legislative background is not itself law.  Legislative history is criticized as so 
indeterminate that it enables judges to reach whatever decision they might desire and 
justify that outcome with reference to some bit of historic legislative record.
Some have questioned the veracity of the legislative record.  Remarks in the 
Congressional Record may be amended after spoken and need not be spoken at all to be 
included as part of the record of floor debate.  The sources of legislative history, such as 
committee reports, may say little about what the legislature did or intended to do and 
more about the preferences of some isolated, unelected congressional staffer.128  Judge 
Kozinski has likewise contended that going beyond statutory text “creates strong 
incentives for manipulating legislative history to achieve through the courts results not 
achievable during the enactment process.”129  The fear is that non-legislators such as 
staffers can “stack the legislative history” to reach a result they favor.130
Well-heeled special interest groups may be empowered by use of legislative 
history, at the expense of the majoritarian public interest.  It is such interest groups with 
the resources to involve themselves intimately in the legislative process that have the best 
opportunity to insert salient language into a committee report, when they could not get 
that language into a bill’s text.131  Thus, even the purportedly most authoritative source of 
legislative history, the committee report, may be unreliable and subject to manipulation.
While these criticisms of legislative intent are superficially logical, they are truly 
just circular arguments.  When critics emphasize that the legislature did not pass the text 
of a committee report and present it to the president, that claim begs the question.  If 
legislators know that certain legislative history will be considered when interpreting the 
bill and pass a bill that has certain legislative history they are functionally “passing” the 
use of that legislative history for textual interpretation.  If a congressional staffer or 
interest group inserts language in a committee report that is unacceptable to the majority, 
nothing prevents the majority (of the committee or of the full body) from disavowing that 
language, in the statutory text or subsequent legislative history.  If the legislative majority 
did not want committee reports or other sources of legislative history to be considered, 
they could say so.  When parties entering into a private contract wish to limit its 
interpretation to its text alone, they include an integration clause that prevents the 
consideration of extrinsic interpretive resources.132  If the legislature wanted to pass the 
128 See Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process, supra note 000, at 823 (describing textualists’ 
criticism that “legislative history is often left to unelected committee staff members” who are “virtually 
unaccountable”).  
129 Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
130 LEGISLATION:  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS, supra note 000, at 181.
131 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 949 (reporting that 
“smuggling in” helpful language through the legislative history is a time-tested practice”).  Justice Scalia 
believes that “committee reports, in particular, are untrustworthy legislative history.”  Id. at 953.
132 See, e.g., Appling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 340 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 
2003) (using presence of integration clauses to preclude consideration of extrinsic evidence); Roxford v. 
Ameritech Corporation, 335 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing integration clause in contract 
interpretation); Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing great weight 
given integration clauses in interpretation).  Most significant for the purpose of this article is the importance 
text and only the text and exclude all judicial reliance on legislative history, the 
legislature could make those wishes plain in the statutory text.  The legislature’s failure to 
do so would seem to imply its approval of such sources.
The practice of deferring to legislative history might be considered an implicit 
incorporation of those materials by reference, rather than an improper delegation of 
legislative authority to the staff.133  Proponents of the unlawful delegation theory have 
responded that any such incorporation should be explicit to be given effect.134  This 
position is insufficiently justified, though, and proves too much.135  Should Congress be 
compelled to explicitly declare that its statutes are to be interpreted according to a 
particular dictionary, or particular rules of grammar, or subject to particular canons of 
construction?136  Requiring such explicit incorporation for particular statutes would 
involve a considerable expenditure of legislative time and effort and yield far more 
complex statutes.  Perhaps for this reason contracts are not required to explicitly list all 
relevant external aids to interpretation, when they may so easily be explicit in their 
exclusion of such external referents.
This analysis of the circularity of the critique of legislative history is supported by 
a social scientific understanding of the operation of Congress.  Legislators, unable to 
examine every particularity of every bill, delegate authority to agents, such as committees 
and their staffs.137  This tendency was recognized long ago by Learned Hand, who 
observed that “while members deliberately express their personal position upon the 
general purposes of the legislation, as to the details of its articulation they accept the 
work of the committees; so much they delegate because legislation could not go in any 
other way.”138  As with any delegation, the agent is expected to conform to the will of the 
that courts put on the absence of an integration clause in permitting consideration of extrinsic evidence.  
See Evergreen Investments LLC v. FCL Graphics, Incorporated, 334 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 2003).
133 See, e.g., Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 2136.
134 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote:  A Response to Professor Siegel, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1541 (2000).
135 Manning argues that specific explicit incorporation of legislative history “would make legislators 
directly responsible for the contents of legislative history, and it would compel them to decide which parts 
of the legislative history they wish to incorporate – and which parts they wish to exclude.”  Id.  While true, 
the argument does not justify why such compulsion of legislators would be constitutionally necessary.  This 
position also might be used to require legislatures to specify particular dictionaries, canons, etc. before they 
should be given effect.  Such an explicitness requirement would impose enormous costs on the legislature 
and restrain its own organizational scheme, adopted for sound reasons as elaborated by the political science 
research.
136 Some have argued that Congress could do precisely this.  See generally Federal Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation, supra note 000.  However, no one to my knowledge has suggested that such explicitness is 
constitutionally compelled, to avoid illegal delegation of legislative authority.
137 See, e.g., Are Mental States Relevant for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation?, supra note 
000, at 1643 (noting that “passive legislators actually choose to delegate to knowledgeable and active 
colleagues the formation of relevant mental states.”)
138 SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2nd Cir. 1935), rev’d, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
principal or face punishment, and congressional staffers perceive that there are “grave 
risks in freelancing” and departing from the preferences of their legislator.139
Considerable political science research addresses the principal-agent relationship 
of the full legislative chamber and the committees.140  Congress creates committees and 
authorizes committee reports for a rational reason.  The committees serve as a “system 
for providing, by specialized and politically accurate reporting, information the chamber 
needs to function amid uncertainty.”141 Keith Krehbiel of Stanford has extensively 
investigated the organization of Congress and the important role that committees play.142
Krehbiel’s position is essentially that “committee members use their position not to 
satisfy parochial interests, but rather to help fulfill the chamber’s need for accurate 
information on policy choices.”143  Committees develop specialized knowledge about 
particular policy problems and legislative responses, thereby avoiding the need for every 
single legislator to investigate every single legislative issue.  The committee agents are 
then to use this information to formulate policies that fit the preferences of the full 
legislative chamber.  Krehbiel has found some evidence that committees act as 
“microcosms of the parent chamber.”144  The actions of committees are monitored both 
by the “chamber majority” and by “whistle-blowers in the minority.”145  Because the full 
body has control over the membership on committees and the resources granted to 
committees, it has some power to enforce the principal-agent relationship between the 
full chamber and the committees producing reports.146
The committees, like any agents, are not perfect fiduciaries of their principal, the 
broader chamber.  Committees, members and staff may sometimes advance their own 
139 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:  A Congressional 
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 609 (2002).
140 See, e.g., David P. Baron, Legislative Organization with Informational Committees, 44 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 435, 435 (2000) (noting that legislatures “choose their internal organization” and recognize that, 
“as in other forms of work, there are gains from the division of labor and specialization through 
committees”).
141 The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, supra note 000, at 268.
142 The prominent writings include Keith Krehbiel, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
ORGANIZATON (1991); Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference 
Outliers?, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 149 (1990); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of 
Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 531 (1990).
143 Forrest Maltzman, Meeting Competing Demands:  Committee Performance in the Postreform 
House, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 653, 654 (1995).
144 Keith Krehbiel, Where’s the Party?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 235, 242 (1993).
145 LEGISLATIONI AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 303.
146 See Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, supra note 000, at 544 
(noting that “the legislature controls the committee’s membership and resources”); Legislative 
Organization with Informational Committees, supra note 000, at 489 (observing that legislature controls 
resources such as “budgets, staff, favors, promises of future vote trades, or other support valued by the 
committee and its members”).
agendas at the expense of the broader interest.  The presence of some infidelity does not 
mean that the chamber does not rely upon the committee for legislation.  Congress suffers 
some policy infidelity as consideration for the costs in effort that committees incur in 
developing specialization and drafting legislation and committee reports.147  Of course, 
the acceptability of infidelity will be greater when the issue is not considered an 
important one to the legislature and much lesser for highly salient issues.  Empirical 
research has confirmed that this is precisely the case.  “Issue salience influences 
committee responsiveness to the chamber.”148  The committees of the greatest importance 
best reflect the preferences of the full body.149 Congressional committees do not advance 
their own ideological interests contrary to the chamber nor further the goals of special 
interest groups; rather, they tend to match the chamber’s preferences.150  Reliance on 
committees is a delegation of authority to the legislative subunit.
Some textualists might claim that this legislative delegation of constitutive
authority to a committee is illegitimate, but that argument proves too much.  Some even 
find it unconstitutional on the grounds that the legislative power is non-delegable.151
Indeed, it would dejustify virtually all legislation.  Even without consideration of their 
reports, committees have the delegated authority to draft the initial language of the 
legislation for the full legislature’s review and, as Arrow’s Theorem shows, such agenda-
setting power gives considerable control over the ultimate decision.152  Most “legislative 
scholars concur that the committee system within the House shapes the policies enacted 
by Congress.”153  Most obviously, the legislature sometimes considers bills under a 
“closed rule” that prohibits floor amendments154 or other restrictions on action by the full 
147 Committees incur a variety of costs associated with developing information and expertise in policy 
areas.  
148 Meeting Competing Demands, supra note 000, at 657.
149 See id. at 666 (noting that “prestige committees” such as appropriations, budget and ways and 
means and “policy committees” like education and labor, judiciary, and energy and commerce” are 
consistent with the preferences of the chamber, while some “constituency committees,” like agriculture and 
public works are less representative of those preferences.  Even in the case of the latter committees, though, 
none had truly significant differences from the preferences of the chamber as a whole.  Id. at 669.  See also
Forrest Maltzman & Steven S. Smith,  Principals, Goals, Dimensionality, and Congressional Committees, 
19 LEG. STUD. Q. 457, 461 (1994) (noting that committees are particularly responsive to the chamber on 
salient legislative matters).
150 See The Receonceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, supra note 000, at 267 
(noting that “political scientists found voting in most congressional committees did not nearly diverge from 
voting in full chambers to the extent the interest group critique would suggest” but instead “matched, more 
or less, voting in the chamber”).
151 See A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 35; John F. Manning, Textualism as 
a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 695 (1997).
152 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 38-39 (1991) 
(discussing this agenda-setting power).
153 Meeting Competing Demands, supra note 000, at 653.
154 The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, supra note 000, at 268.
chamber.155 Even without such a closed rule, the body as a whole typically accepts the 
committee language without any changes.156  In general, the “full chambers do not, by 
voting, make the choices, but rather they accept choices about details already made.”157
The argument against reliance on, or delegation to, staff undermines textualism 
just as it undermines legislative history.  A survey found that staffers typically have the 
responsibility for drafting statutory language.158  Lobbyists are also regularly involved in 
drafting the language of bills.159  The legislators “generally did not read the text” of the 
bills drafted by the staffers.160  Staffers were just as likely to “freelance” when drafting 
text as when drafting legislative history.161  The survey of congressional staff found that 
there was “no strong basis” for distinguishing between text and legislative history based 
on staffer involvement.162 The distinction between the two is artificial.  Judge Wald has 
observed that when a member of Congress votes for a bill “he or she intends to give 
approval to and put imprimatur on both the language of the statute and the process that 
produced it.”163
Individual legislators may often “vote for technical language that the legislator 
does not understand, knowing that committee members believe . . . it has a proper 
function.”164  They may not even have read the language of the bill on which they vote.165
Justice Scalia seemingly accepts this fact, that the legislators “do not know the details of 
155 See Legislative Organization with Informational Committees, supra note 000, at 489 (noting that 
the “House has increasingly used restrictive rules that specify in advance the amendments allowed on the 
floor”).
156 See Legislative Organization with Informational Committees, supra note 000, at 489 (citing study 
that “relatively few bills reported by House committees are amended”).  The percentages for amended 
legislation was 6%, 30%, and 15% for the years 1955, 1974, and 1986.  Id.
157 Id.
158 The Politics of Legislative Drafting, supra note 000, at 585.
159 Id. at 587.
160 Id. at 608.
161 Id. at 610.
162 Id. at 620.
163 Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper:  The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in 
the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 307 (1990).
164 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
845, 866 (1992).
165 See, e.g., LEGISLATION:  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  TWENTY QUESTIONS, supra
note 000, at 37 (suggesting that “few legislators review statutory language carefully, and most may have 
little idea what it contains”); CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 955 
(“legislators do not ‘read’ all the statutes they enact, either”).
the legislation itself.”166  He responds that this is irrelevant as it ignores “the central point 
that genuine knowledge is a precondition for the supposed authoritativeness of a 
committee report and not a precondition for the authoritativeness of a statute.”167  This 
response would seem to be more of an assertion of a conclusion than an argument.
Actual knowledge need not be required in either case, if there is a delegation to a trusted 
agent.  The critics have yet to explain why a delegation to committees of unchecked 
report-writing authority to guide interpretation would be illegitimate, when delegation to 
committees of unchecked statute-writing authority is of unchallenged legitimacy.
The significance of an item of legislative history, such as a committee report, is
not intrinsically significant but is significant because the full Congress has delegated 
some authority to that committee to clarify the meaning of a bill.  The committee is 
exercising the authority of the full chamber.  Indeed, one might wonder why committees 
would bother to go to the trouble of writing reports, if they were of no legal significance.
Dismissing the significance of such reports is dismissive of legislative choice.168 The 
logical implication of the critique would call for the total elimination of many forms of 
legislative history, such as committee reports.  This judicial intrusion on the organization 
of a coordinate branch is seldom if ever justified, though.
The circularity of the criticism can also be illustrated through another route.  
Dedicated textualists do not hesitate to use extratextual sources other than legislative 
history.  Most typically, they will consult a dictionary or perhaps use some canon of 
construction.  Of course, the legislature never passed the contents of the dictionary or 
canon into law.  This does not trouble the textualist, who uses those sources only as 
guides to interpretation of the text that the Congress did pass, not as independent sources 
of law.  Yet the same could be said of legislative history that is used as a guide to 
interpretation of the text that the Congress did pass.  These common theoretical 
criticisms, thus, are not actually criticisms of judicial use of legislative history but only 
criticisms of judicial misuse of legislative history.  While they appear independent, the 
criticisms collapse into the fundamental claim that legislative history invites misuse at the 
hands of ideological judges.
Even those who favor the consideration of legislative history may have theoretical 
questions about some categories of legislative history, such as post-enactment legislative 
history. Using post-enactment materials is troublesome on several levels.  For those who 
believe in traditional textualism, post-enactment legislative history is especially 
troublesome, because such history is not contemporaneous with the law and entirely 
disconnected with the formalities of its passage.  If one acknowledges that the current 
legislature may not share the same preferences as the enacting legislature, giving weight 
to post-enactment legislative history functionally creates an unconstitutional category of 
legislation.  It allows a legislature to amend the content of prior statutes through 
166 A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 34.
167 Id. at 34-35.
168 See, e.g., The Sizzling Sleeper, supra note 000, at 306 (asking:  “If we are serous about respecting 
the will of Congress, how can we ignore Congress’ chosen methods for expressing that will?); Muriel 
Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant:  Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 588 (1994) 
(arguing that “[t]o denigrate legislative history is to denigrate Congress as an institution”).
commentary, without going through the process of legislating.  This same criticism 
arguably applies to any reliance on legislative acquiescence or re-enactment.
The lack of contemporaneity of post-enactment legislative history can also be 
troublesome for those using a legislative intent standard for statutory interpretation.  Even 
those who argue that Congress has properly delegated some legislative authority to 
committees to create governing legislative history might not believe that Congress 
delegated its authority to unknown future committees to retrospectively interpret the law
passed by an earlier Congress.  Post-enactment legislative history is not necessarily 
troublesome to pragmatists and may be consistent with dynamic statutory interpretation, 
though it still has the reliability questions associated with any legislative history.  
The preceding theoretical debate over the legitimacy of relying on legislative 
history or other evidence of legislative intent may cover up the true basis for concern 
about the practice.  The greatest practical critique of reliance on legislative history may 
be based on the discretion it gives judges in interpretation and consequent facilitation of 
ideological bias.  Segal and Spaeth question the sincerity of its use, just as they 
questioned textualism.169  Justice Scalia argues that the use of legislative history “has 
facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based on the courts’ policy preferences, 
rather than neutral principles of law.”170  He analogized it to looking over the heads of the 
crowd to pick out your friends.”171 One can often find at least a few friends even in a 
generally hostile crowd just as one might find ideologically convenient legislative history 
in an otherwise contrary text and record.
There is nothing intrinsic in consultation of legislative history that is biased (the 
congressional record may be conservative or liberal), the use of the tool may invite 
insincere interpretation as a practical matter.  The legislative history of a major law 
includes a substantial body of commentary, ranging from committee reports to the 
remarks of individual legislators.  In this multitudinous commentary, an interpreter may 
find it easier to support a preferred position.172  Judge Kozinski has suggested that 
“[l]egislative history can be cited to support almost any proposition, and frequently is.”173
The conventional wisdom is that the resort to legislative history facilitates ideological 
judging, and this claim may be the most common critique of reliance on legislative 
history.174  Consequently, the purpose of constraining ideological judicial choice arguably 
counsels for rules that prevent reliance on legislative history.
169 THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 000, at 
75 (suggesting that “[g]iven the variety of reasons that legislative intent may not exist, and the problems of 
finding it in those cases where it does exist, perhaps we ought to discard completely judicial efforts to 
fathom intent.”  
170 A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 35.
171 Id. at 36.
172 See id. (noting that for “any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is extensive, and 
there is something for everybody”).
173 See Robert Pear, With Rights Act Comes Fight to Clarify Congress’s Intent,” N.Y.T. Nov. 18, 
1991, at A1.
174 See note ____ supra.
The discernment of legislative intent need not be confined to the legislative 
history.  Courts sometimes consider the overriding purpose of the law in its 
interpretation.  A legislature’s purpose might be gleaned from the text of the statute itself, 
or its structure.175  If a purpose is not apparent from the text, perhaps it should not be 
transformed into law.  Purposes “are not transmitted frictionlessly into legislation”176 and 
the legislature doubtless has many purposes that never find their way into any legislation 
at all.177 The search for some definitive legislative purpose may therefore be vain.
Analysis of legislative purpose has been controversial for a number of other 
reasons.  For a time, the evaluation of legislative purpose was ascendant in statutory 
interpretation.178  Reliance on legislative purpose, though, has its own interpretive 
problems.179  The purpose of a statute is not always clear from its text and context.  When 
Congress passed the civil rights laws, was its primary purpose to prevent discrimination 
against minorities who had historically suffered discrimination or to prevent all 
discrimination based on membership in a protected class?  One could argue for either.  It 
seems plausible that Congress had both purposes, which is unhelpful when those two 
goals come into conflict.180
Even if a statute has but one goal, turning to legislative purpose can be 
problematic.  Some limiting principle is required but not offered by analysis of legislative 
purpose.  Suppose a statute is written to advance the public health through specific 
measures.  The legislative purpose is clear and unobjectionable and without direct 
internal conflict.  Yet Congress did not pass a law declaring:  “do everything conceivable 
to protect the public health.”  The law is not unlimited.  Reliance on the generalized 
legislative purpose in interpretive controversies, though, is unlimited.  Consequently, the 
attempt to further the legislative purpose inevitably undermines the actual legislation, by 
delimiting its scope.
175 See infra at ___, note 000.
176 The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2409.
177 See The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2410 (noting that textualists argue that the 
legislative process “is too complex, too path-dependent, and too opaque to allow judges to reconstruct 
whether Congress would have resolved any particular question differently from the way the clear statutory 
text resolves the question”).
178 See John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 283, 288 
(2002) (discussing how legislative purpose survived legal realism and was embraced by those devoted to 
the legal process school of theory); Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 426 
(noting that legislative purpose “was especially popular among academic commentators in the 1950’s and 
1960’s”).
179 See, e.g., Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 428 (finding some value 
to analysis of legislative purpose but stressing that “the effort to characterize legislative purpose often 
produces serious problems, whether or not circumstances have changed”).
180 See LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra  note 000, at 222 (noting 
that “[p]urpovism does not yield determinate answers when there is no neutral way to arbitrate among 
different purposes”).
The greatest difficulty with reliance on legislative purpose may be its inherent 
inconsistency.  Every statute has at least two conflicting purposes.  Consider the Clean 
Air Act.  The paramount purpose of this statute obviously was to provide for government 
regulation to prevent air pollution.  Yet the statute did not call for the impossible goal of 
the elimination of all air pollution; it called for the reduction of pollution under certain 
circumstances and limits.  The universal invocation of the anti-pollution purpose of the 
Clean Air Act would clearly defeat the legislative purpose, in cases that fell within one of 
the limitations on that purpose.  The Supreme court has observed that “no legislation 
pursues its purposes at all costs.”181  Statutes rarely command absolutes and are typically 
compromises between conflicting purposes.182  In the presence of such conflict, reliance 
on legislative purpose is either fruitless or misleading.
Legislative purpose analysis may also be amenable to ideological judging.  
Discerning the purpose of a statute is certainly a subjective process.  Arguably, “willful, 
manipulative judges” will attribute “a purpose to the statute that just happens to coincide 
with the judges’ own policy preferences.”183  Professor Ely has suggested that “only a 
hopelessly result-oriented judge would be able to assert that he knew which was ‘the’ 
motivation or the ‘dominant’ motivation underlying a statute.”184  Indeed, the concept of 
legislative purpose does not even require particular supporting materials of legislative 
history and might therefore be more discretionary and potentially ideological than 
reliance on legislative history.
Reliance on legislative acquiescence in past judicial interpretations is also 
commonly challenged.  At a theoretical level, the acquiescence of a later, different 
legislature cannot be a reliable guide to the intent of the enacting legislature, so 
intentionalists would not necessarily favor this aspect of legislative history.  Textualists 
would not be expected to weight the position of later legislatures about the earlier 
statutes, and acquiescence in the form of inaction obviously has not surmounted the 
181 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646-647 (1990).
182 See Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, supra note 000, at 809 
(observing that “if, as is often true, the statute is a compromise between one group of legislators that holds 
a simple remedial objective but lacks a majority and another group that has reservations about the 
objective, a court that construed the statute broadly would upset the compromise that the statute was 
intended to embody”); Statute’s Domains, supra note 000,at 541 (noting that lawmakers “seeking only to 
further the public interest may conclude that the provision of public rules should reach so far and o farther, 
whether because of deliberate compromise, because of respect for private orderings, or because of 
uncertainty coupled with concern that to regulate in the face of the unknown is to risk loss for little gain”); 
The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2418 (observing that “Congress may be unanimous in its intent 
to stamp out some vague social or economic evil; however, because its members may differ sharply on the 
means for effectuating that intent,” so that invocation of legislative purpose “at the expense of the terms of 
the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in the end, prevents the effectuation 
of congressional intent”).  
183 From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat, supra note 000,a t 251.
184 John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 
1204, 1214 (1970).  See also Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause 
Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1318 (2003) (reporting a “significant danger that 
aggressive inquiry into legislative purpose” could sometimes “be perceived as transparently political”).
constitutional hurdles to legislative enactment.  While the Court has occasionally relied 
upon legislative acquiescence, it has done so carefully, describing the doctrine as “at best 
only an auxiliary tool,” as the Court does “not expect Congress to make an affirmative 
move every time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation.”185 Both 
textualists and those who use legislative history might be more amenable to legislative 
acquiescence, though, when the statute was reauthorized or revised, because the prior 
judicial interpretations could be considered part of the context of the new statute.
Legislative acquiescence might seem consistent with a pragmatic or dynamic 
approach to statutory interpretation, but even this association is debatable. As Posner has 
observed, “[l]egislative agendas are crowded, the procedural barriers to enactment 
formidable, and as a result legislatures usually can’t undo judicial decisions they don’t 
like.”186  Thus, legislative acquiescence does not equate with approval from more recent 
legislatures.  Acquiescence may result from the issue being too insignificant to warrant 
the expenditure of legislative time, or acquiescence may result from the controversial 
nature of the matter and the inability to reach a subsequent legislative compromise.
Hence, even pragmatists might be cautious about reliance on pure acquiescence, in the 
absence of statutory reauthorization or revision.
C. Interpretive Canons
Historically, certain “canons” have been used in statutory interpretation.  The 
canons are judicially-created guidelines for the meaning of statutory language, under 
certain circumstances.  The canons might be considered either dispositive guides to 
interpretation or mere presumptions.  As guides to interpretation, the canonical approach 
is distinct from the debate over text vs. legislative history and might even be considered 
orthogonal to that approach.  Hence, reliance on the canons cannot necessarily be 
predicted from a justice’s view about the purposes of or appropriate tools for statutory 
interpretation.  
1. The canonical approach
Canons may be simply interpretive rules for text. The canons of statutory 
interpretation are of two distinct types.  The first type is the linguistic canons.  These are 
like rules of grammar that enable textual understanding, and some are actual rules of
grammar.  The second type is the substantive canon, which creates a preference for a 
category of outcome, though not necessarily an ideological end.  The linguistic canons 
have a considerable historical pedigree, as reflected in the Latin language in which they 
are often expressed.
The linguistic canons are intended as simple guides to interpretation, much like 
the rules of grammar.  Among the best known linguistic canons is expression unius est 
exclusion alterius.  Under this canon, the statutory inclusion of a particular approach or 
authorization is interpreted as a presumption that other approaches or authorities are 
185 Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 533-534 (1947).
186 THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 000, at 301.
excluded.187 The linguistic canons of ejusdem generic and noscitur a sociis may be 
viewed in tandem.  Both establish a presumption that particular words should be 
interpreted according to the company they keep and not viewed in isolation.188 The 
literal rules of grammar themselves may also serve as interpretive canons, e.g., 
punctuation informs interpretation.189  These canons might be embraced by textualists as 
part of the essential context of statutory language.  Intentionalists might also rely on the 
canons, on the theory that, as linguistic rules, they are presumably guides to the intent 
underneath the legislative language.
Another set of canons is based on substantive policy and establish presumptions 
for resolving unclear language.  An early substantive canon was the principle that statutes 
should not be interpreted in derogation of the common law.190  If a statutory text admitted 
of two different interpretations, this canon directed judges to choose the interpretation 
most consistent with the preexisting common law.  The substantive canons represent built 
in biases for certain categories of outcomes.  These canons include presumptions that 
statutes not be interpreted in derogation of sovereignty, that public grants be strictly 
limited, that statutes not have extraterritorial  application, that traditional state powers be 
preserved, that judicial review be available, and others.191
The “rule of lenity” is an important substantive canon in cases involving a 
criminal prosecution.  It holds that if the criminal statute “does not clearly outlaw private 
conduct, the private actor cannot be punished.”192 The effect of the rule is to allow 
certain defendants, whose actions may be borderline criminal, to escape punishment, with 
the goal of forcing the legislature to clearly prescribe the perimeters of the actions that it 
wishes to criminalize.  The rule of lenity is commonly invoked in criminal litigation and 
also justified by the need to provide fair notice or warning of action that is illegal.  The 
scope of the rule of lenity is quite flexible, though, and permits convictions in the 
presence of some statutory ambiguity, but not “grievous ambiguity.”193
The principle that statutes be construed so as to avoid creating serious 
constitutional questions could be considered another substantive canon.194 If a statute is 
187 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 824-825 (summarizing 
and critiquing this canon).
188 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 822-823 (summarizing 
these canons).
189 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 826-829 (discussing 
how rules of grammar are used in statutory interpretation).
190 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 920-921, 934-935 
(addressing the common law canon).
191 CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 849-851.
192 CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 852.
193 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994).
194 For discussions of this canon, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 
1945 (1997); Lisa Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994).
subject to two reasonable interpretations, and one of those interpretations would create 
serious constitutional questions, this canon calls for the adoption of the other 
interpretation.  
The preceding examples are only a partial list of what might be considered 
substantive canons of statutory interpretation.  Others are less general in application and 
not so frequently invoked, but they may be critical in a particular case. In general, the 
substantive canons are not so well established as the linguistic canons, but some have a 
considerable history and general acceptance.
2. The critique of the canons
The linguistic canons appear on their face to be logical, uncontroversial and 
ideologically neutral means of accurately interpreting statutory language.  This 
appearance was dispelled long ago by Karl Llewellyn, however.195  Llewellyn, in his 
legal realism, contended that the canons themselves were highly indeterminate and could 
be deployed by judges to reach desired results.  To demonstrate this, he produced a chart 
of the canons in “thrusts” and “parries,” showing that, like so many aphorisms, each 
canon had a counterpoint.196  A judge could simply choose the thrust or the parry in order 
to reach his preferred end.  Llewellyn concluded that we should give up the “foolish 
pretense” that judges should rely on “mutually contradictory correct rules” of statutory 
interpretation.197  Thus, the canons, like legislative history, simply provided convenient 
beards for ideological decisionmaking.
For some time, Llewellyn’s claim was accepted and became the conventional 
wisdom.198 The Supreme Court itself has taken notice that canons “are often countered 
by some maxim pointing in a different direction.”199  This tendency of the canons does 
not simply make them incoherent.  Rather, the presence of canons pointing in opposite 
directions enables greater judicial discretion.  A judge may pick and choose the canon he 
or she wishes, in order to reach the result that he or she desires.  Self-contradicting 
canons empower the willful judge and result-oriented rulings.
Even if the canons were not self-contradictory, they may be challenged on logical 
grounds.  Consider the expression unius canon.  When one makes a list, it is not 
necessarily exclusive or comprehensive.  If a person makes a list of “foods he likes,” it 
does not imply that he dislikes every single food not contained on that list.  The person 
195 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).  The article has been called a “fiendishly 
deconstructive” attack on the canons.  Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist:  Statutes and the 
New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983).
196 Id. at 401-406.
197 Id. at 399.
198 See Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, supra note 000, at 805 
(observing that “it has been many years since any legal scholar had a good word to say about any but one or 
two of the canons”).
199 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001).
may have overlooked some foods and may not have even considered other foods that he 
has not yet sampled.200  Likewise a legislature “might create an exception to a general 
grant without thereby wanting to prevent the courts from recognizing additional 
exceptions, unforeseen at the time of enactment, that would be consistent with the grant’s 
purposes.”201  Cass Sunstein has also noted that the failure to include an item in a list 
“may reflect inadvertence, inability to reach consensus, or a decision to delegate the 
decision to the courts.”202  The rule does not even necessarily comport with ordinary 
language usage. As Max Radin put it, “to say that all men are mortal does not mean that 
all women are not or that all other animals are not.”203  Richard Posner has declared more 
generally that “most of the canons are just wrong” and do not reflect legislative intent or 
even common sense.204
The linguistic canons have their defenders, though.  Textualists have embraced 
the canons as guides for interpretation that required no evaluation of legislative intent.205
The contemporary revival of the canons has not been limited to textualists.  Cass Sunstein 
has argued that Llewellyn’s critique was “greatly overstated.”206 David Shapiro called
the critique of the canons “grossly overdone.”207  Certainly, it is difficult to argue that the 
rules of grammar should be ignored when interpreting language.  Even the contemporary 
defenders of the canons presented only a limited defense, however.  For example, Shapiro 
claims only that the “maxim of inclusio unius is a useful tie-breaker.”208  The canons, 
even when they represent correct rules for interpretation, are thus “at best of modest 
utility.”209
200 For additional examples of the illogic of expression unius, see CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 824-825.
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(1983).
205 See Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, supra note 000, at 290 (describing how the textualists 
have embraced the canons as an alternative to attempts to ascertain legislative intent).
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The substantive canons have their own theoretical critics.  The canon counseling 
against derogation of the common law rule may have been logical in the early age of 
statutory regulation but makes less sense in a contemporary world, where statutes are the 
rule.210  One might fairly argue that the very purpose of statutes is to derogate the 
common law – if the preexisting common law was deemed satisfactory, no statute would 
be necessary.211  This canon may also produce an intrinsic conservative bias in statutory 
interpretation.212  Regulatory statutes typically have a liberal end, somehow restraining 
the laissez faire use of private property, so any narrowing interpretation of such statutes 
will serve conservative purposes.213  The substantive canons are not consistently 
conservative in operation, though, and may in fact tend to favor liberal outcomes.
In contrast to the conservative purposes of the common law canon, the rule of 
lenity appears to systematically favor liberal outcomes in favor of criminal defendants.
The canon in favor of giving liberal interpretations to remedial statutes also will tend to 
produce ideologically liberal decisions. The canon against interpretations raising serious 
constitutional questions may also have a tendency to produce ideological liberal 
outcomes, at least in the numerous constitutional provisions considered liberal.  Other 
canons, such as those favoring the preservation of federalism, may tend to yield relatively 
conservative results.
While the fact that the substantive canons have no consistent ideological bias 
might seem to make them ideologically neutral, this inconsistency may have the opposite 
result.  The conservative bias of the common law canon will frequently run up against the 
liberal bias of the remedial statute canon, as remedial statutes typically modify the 
common law rule.  In this case, the canons simply free the judge to pick and choose the 
most ideologically amenable canon and apply it.  Thus, one would expect a conservative, 
such as Justice Scalia, to favor the common law canon and deprecate the remedial statute 
canon, as in fact he has.214  With such a conflict, the canons do not serve to constrain 
ideological decisionmaking but actually further such imposition of judicial ideology, 
because they provide additional tools for the ideologically minded judge.  Indeed, Scalia 
210 See Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 409-411 (arguing that 
standards of interpretation should have “outgrown the understandings that underlay the initial period of 
judicial antagonism” to statutory regulation).
211 This is not always the case.  Some statutes, especially those enacted before the regulatory age such 
as the Sherman Act, may have been written to enact common law principles.  See Statutory Interpretation –
in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, supra note 000, at 818 (suggesting that this was the goal of section 
one of the Sherman Act).  The presence of some such statutes does not warrant reliance on the canon as a 
general rule, however.  Even defenders of the canon, though, have suggested that it “seems woefully 
anachronistic” in the modern regulatory state.  See Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation,
supra note 000, at 949.
212 See Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, supra note 000, at 821 
(suggesting that the canon has been used to “emasculate social legislation”).
213 This conservative effect of the common law canon is not a universal one.  See, e.g., Continuity and 
Change in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 948 (discussing counterexamples).  The lack of 
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himself has criticized the substantive canons for adding a “thumb of indeterminate 
weight” to the decisionmaking scale, a practice that will not yield “uniformity or 
objectivity.”215
Some reliance upon canons of interpretation is inevitable, because they are 
nothing more than rules for interpreting language.  Without such rules, language has no 
meaning.216 Absent the interpretive direction provided by canons, there is no basis for 
concluding that “black” does not encompass “white,” or that the affirmative excludes the 
negative.  This defense of canons in general theory, though, does not provide a defense 
for the actual canons in operation.  While some set of canons is necessary and desirable 
as assistance in interpreting language, the current set of canons might not effectively 
serve this purpose.  If Llewellyn is correct, the prevailing canons do not guide 
interpretation.
Canons are also inevitably appealing to the judiciary, because they seem to offer 
neutral principles for statutory interpretation that constrain ideological judicial 
decisionmaking, which may be tantamount to legislating.  Canons expressed in Latin may 
seem particularly judicial.  Even the substantive canons, which are not neutral in their 
implications, are at least consistent interpretive rules that should not vary with the 
ideological proclivities of the particular justice.  This effect may be a convenient fiction, 
however.  Posner argues that use of the canons actually promotes such judicial activism 
because they “do not constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to 
create the appearance that his decisions are constrained.”  As such, they may facilitate 
ideological decisionmaking rather than constrain it.
IV. The Justices and Theories of Statutory Interpretation
In general, the Supreme Court justices have not entered the academic fray on the 
theories of statutory interpretation.  There are exceptions to this rule, though, with Justice 
Scalia by far the most notable exception.  Justice Scalia has bravely held forth, both in 
academic writings and judicial opinions, on the theories of statutory interpretation.  The 
above discussion has drawn on Justice Scalia’s views in elaborating theories, and this 
section will summarize that position.  His position clearly favors a textualist, rule of law 
approach to the interpretation of statutes.  He distinguishes this approach from a 
“literalist” approach of “strict constructionism,” though, by considering the context of the 
text.217  He even “delivered a series of speeches” that urged the courts “to abandon 
virtually any reference to legislative history.”218
Justice Scalia is also a defender of the linguistic canons of interpretation.  He has 
referred to them as “so commonsensical that, were [they] not couched in Latin, you 
215 A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 28-29. 
216 See Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, supra note 000, at 291 (contending that legislation “is 
meaningless in a world without canons of construction”).
217 Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997)
218 CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 000, at 743. 
would find it hard to believe that anyone could criticize them.”219 Scalia challenges 
Llewellyn’s thrusts and parries, suggesting that the parries are simply the product of 
“willful, law-bending” judges.220 He will depart from his devotion to plain meaning, in 
deference to canons, as he has held that the “ordinary meaning of the language in its 
textual context” should control unless  “established canons of construction” require a 
different result.”221  Indeed, Scalia is said to use the canons “aggressively,” even when 
they “carry him far afield from any plain meaning or ordinary usage that an ordinary 
reader, or even a member of Congress voting on the statute, might glean from the text.”222
Scalia does not embrace every canon, though.223  His feelings on the substantive canons 
might be described as mixed.224
Scalia’s approach to statutory interpretation is renowned.  He is known for his 
“steadfast refusal ever to consider legislative history.”225 His rejection of legislative 
history is grounded in multiple reasons.  First, he rejects the theory that judicial statutory 
interpretation should be grounded in the purpose of fulfilling legislative intent.  Scalia 
notes at a basic level that the members of Congress “need have nothing in mind in order 
for their votes to be both lawful and effective”226 as evidence that intent is irrelevant.  
Indeed, he suggests that in most cases this is the fact – that Congress didn’t consider a 
matter or had no particular intent in mind when it did consider the matter.227
In addition, Scalia questions the reliability of legislative history as a guide to what 
legislative intent may exist.  He has declared that neither statements of legislators, 
Executive statements or even the nonenactment of proposals “is a reliable indication of 
what a majority of both Houses of Congress intended when they voted for the statute 
before us.”228 Scalia also fears that judicial reliance on legislative history “will only 
219 A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 25.
220 Id.
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encourage cynical attempts by interest groups – and their well-placed congressional allies 
– to tailor the legislative history to influence future court.”229  He also questions any 
reference to the statements or actions of any subsequent Congresses, such as reliance on 
legislative acquiescence, declaring it irrelevant “what committees of the 99th and 95th
Congresses thought the 76th Congress intended.”230
Scalia also derogates the reliability of the legislative record.  He argues that 
references in congressional committee reports “were inserted, at best by a committee staff 
member on his or her own initiative, and at worse by a committee staff member at the 
suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist.”231
In addition to the above criticisms, Justice Scalia’s central concern about the use 
of legislative history is its amenability to ideological manipulation. He declares it 
“dangerous to assume that, even with the utmost self-discipline, judges can prevent the 
implications they see from mirroring the policies they favor” when using legislative 
history.232  Scalia sees textualism as a path that can minimize this results-oriented 
statutory interpretation.
Justice Scalia has also rejected substantial reliance on legislative purpose as an 
interpretive standard, stressing that the “principle of our democratic system is not that 
each legislature enacts a purpose, independent of the language of the statute, which the 
courts must then perpetuate.”233 Scalia does not wholly reject consideration of legislative 
purpose, though.234  The purpose is surely a part of the context necessary for analyzing 
the textual language.  He does prefer to discern the legislative purpose from the text or 
structure of an Act, rather than legislative commentary that is subject to the shortcomings 
of any analysis of legislative history.235
Although Scalia has presented extensive theoretical analysis of statutory 
interpretation, his key concern seems to involve the project of this empirical research –
that the judiciary will use the tools of interpretation to reach the results they ideologically 
prefer.  He argues that “under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed 
legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and 
desires.”236  He argues that utilization of legislative history facilitates judges’ ability to 
229 Karkkainen, supra note 000, at 420.
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make decisions grounded in their own policy preferences rather than in the law.237
Scalia’s repeated concern is about “willful judges who bend the law to their wishes.”238
Scalia’s general approach to statutory interpretation is widely known but often 
oversimplified.  While he is stereotyped as a classic textualist, he sometimes appears to
bow to pragmatism in statutory interpretation.239  Indeed, he has even declared the 
“consideration of policy consequences” to be one of the “traditional tools of statutory 
construction.”240 Scalia has thus accepted the absurdity doctrine and demonstrated a 
willingness to ignore text that would produce an absurd result.241  Scalia has also 
accepted Chevron deference to administrative agency interpretations, which might be 
considered a pragmatic approach.242  He has consistently assailed reliance on legislative 
history.
Justice Scalia’s view is typically juxtaposed against the contrasting theory of 
Justice Breyer, who has also written on interpretive theories for statutes, including 
testifying before Congress, before he was elevated to the Supreme Court.243  Breyer does 
not reject reliance on statutory text but argues that textualism “does not offer much help 
in particular cases,” because clear text is not litigated.244 Consequently, he would rely 
upon extratextual sources for guidance in statutory interpretation, particularly legislative 
history.
Breyer has developed what might be called the “busy Congress” model, reflecting 
the political science understanding of delegation to committees.245  He notes that 
“legislation is not spontaneously generated, but arises out of a highly complex, public, 
time-consuming, detailed process of hearings, debate, and negotiation, typically 
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involving most, or all, of those groups whom the future law will likely affect.”246  While 
this busyness might support the argument that misleading bits of legislative history could 
be inserted into the record, Breyer argues that those “directly involved . . . will subject, 
not only the text of the law but also committee reports, floor statements, and other 
relevant comments to scrutiny; they too may become the subject of negotiation.”247
While the elected representatives of the people are not familiar with all the legislative 
history, they also may be unfamiliar with particulars of statutory text.248  In both cases, 
they may rely on staff and affected groups “to identify major controversial matters and to 
help resolve them.”249  Hence, the legislative history is an integral part of the bill, much 
like the text itself.
Breyer has continued his public support for reliance on legislative history and 
elaborated on its basis.  He argues for a purposive, rather than a linguistic, approach to 
interpretation, in both statutory and constitutional matters.  Breyer’s proposed approach 
to a case asks “how a (hypothetical) reasonable member of Congress, given the statutory 
language, structure, history, and purpose, would have answered the question, had it been 
presented.”250  His preference is grounded in a constitutional respect for democratic 
governance and a pragmatic consequentialist concern.  While Breyer concedes that his
methodology is a subjective one, he argues that the textualist “does not escape 
subjectivity, for his tools, language, history, and tradition can provide little objective 
guidance in the comparatively small set” of important Supreme Court cases.251 The 
textualist outcome will be “no less subjective” but “far less transparent than a decision 
that directly addresses consequences.”252
The methodological positions of the other justices, who have not addressed the 
issue outside opinions, are not so clear.  Justice Stevens has written very briefly on a 
clever Shakespearean perspective on interpretation.253  He noted that the first rule of 
statutory interpretation was to “read the statute,” but cautioned that the statutory text 
would not necessarily resolve the controversy before the Court.254  He proceeded to 
declare that:  “If you are desperate, or even if you just believe it may shed some light on 
the issue, consult the legislative history,” but cautioned that such history may be an 
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unreliable guide.255  He also gestured to pragmatism in calling for the use of “good sense” 
in judicial statutory interpretation.256  His article is consistent with a pluralist approach to 
interpretation.
Other justices have not left such a paper trail, and their respective approaches are 
not entirely clear.  In a review of the 1988-89 term, Judge Wald characterized justices 
Scalia and Kennedy as “true believers” in textualism, and suggested that Justices 
Rehnquist and O’Connor leaned in that direction.257  At around that time, Professor 
Eskridge described Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy as “statutory nominalists,” 
while he considered Justices Stevens and O’Connor as “pragmatists.”258  Twelve years 
later, he concluded that Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer were pragmatic 
textualists.259  Like Stevens, many of the justices might be considered pluralists, using 
different theories in different cases, rather than true devotees of any one approach to 
statutory interpretation.260  A review focusing on maritime decisions argued that Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer had a natural law approach that 
considered the purpose behind the law, while Justices Scalia and Thomas were 
“formalists” focused on text, Justice Rehnquist was deferential to the legislature and thus 
open to legislative history, and Justice Stevens was an “instrumentalist” more closely 
attendant to consequences.261  These conclusions seem to be ad hoc assessments based on 
a reading of Supreme Court opinions.  The best evidence of the justices’ approaches, 
though, is available in a more systematic study of their opinions, which are analyzed in 
the following section.
V. Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
An enormous amount of ink has been spilled on statutory interpretation, much of 
it dealing with matters descriptive rather than purely normative.  Academics have made 
claims about the types of interpretation that prevail at the court and about their effects.  
Some claim that the utilization of legislative intent simply empowers ideological 
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decisionmaking, while others assert that textualism is equally vulnerable to ideological 
manipulation.  While these claims typically have some empirical support, in the form of 
case examples, this evidence is anecdotal and not rigorous.  This section provides a more 
rigorous analysis of the practice of statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court and the 
effect of different approaches.
There is some limited quantitative empirical study of statutory interpretation in 
the courts.  One study quantitatively analyzed the use of statutory interpretation 
methodologies by the Supreme Court.262  It analyzed the sources used in statutory 
interpretation over the Court’s history since the 1890s.  Text was the most common 
resource (appearing in 84.1% of the cases) and the materials of legislative history have 
been commonly used (reports in 32% of the cases, debates in 16.9% of the cases, and 
hearings in 12.6% of the cases).263  Citations on the consideration of practical 
consequences, while not so frequent, consistently occurred.264  The use of these materials 
remained fairly stable over time.265  The results also found that citations to textual and 
legislative history sources were associated with one another, implying that the two are not 
in the conflict often hypothesized.
This existing empirical research is of historical significance but doesn’t help 
much in answering the key questions regarding statutory interpretation, however.  This 
study only coded citations, though.266  Consequently, a majority opinion that declared 
certain legislative history to be unreliable would be coded as using legislative history.  
More significantly, the study did not consider any effects of ideology or individual 
justices.  Understanding the role played by different approaches to statutory interpretation 
requires analysis of particular opinions and outcomes from particular justices.
One recent study by Howard and Segal sought to capture the intersections of 
interpretive theory and ideology in a rigorous fashion.267  The authors sought to test for 
the justices’ fidelity to the interpretive theory of originalism in both constitutional and 
statutory cases.  They examined briefs filed with the Court and coded them as to whether 
the litigants made claims that the text supported their position and whether that claim was 
disputed by the other side in the case.268  The authors then examined each justice’s vote 
based on the nature of the textual arguments and the ideology of the parties.  They found 
that the presence of legal arguments based on text or intent were not statistically 
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significant determinants of votes, when controlling for ideology.269  These findings give 
cause to question the sincerity of the judicial devotion to interpretive methodologies.
The Howard and Segal research does not truly answer the important statutory 
interpretation questions, however.  They combined constitutional and statutory cases, 
though the two present distinctly different theoretical approaches.  Their analysis was 
based entirely on the briefs filed with the court and did not consider the theories that were 
actually employed in the opinions of the Court.  Finally, they used a very two-
dimensional system of coding, without considering the broader spectrum of the theories.  
Thus, they did not consider such arguments as the absurdity doctrine and the canons of 
interpretation and did not distinguish between references to legislative history and 
legislative purpose.  The following analysis elaborates on this research to fill these gaps.
Empirical analysis cannot discern the internal reasons of a justice’s thinking.270
The data cannot demonstrate conclusively that a justice is consciously insincere and
adopts a particular theory in a particular case (or generally) for the reason that it yields 
ideologically desirable results.  Empirical results can inform our evaluation of these 
reasons, however.  More significantly, such analysis can show the real world 
consequences of particular interpretive theories, which is of greater import than the 
internal reason, in any case.271
A. The Methodology of the Quantitative Empirical Analysis
The study involves Supreme Court decisions involving statutory interpretation 
between the years 1994 and 2002, inclusive.  The time period roughly captures the 
natural court following Stephen Breyer’s appointment.  Cases were initially screened 
through use of West’s key number system, for cases with a headnote on “statutes.”  These 
cases were then screened for decisions using one of the interpretive methods studied.  
Over 120 cases were sampled, providing over one thousand separate justice-votes for 
analysis.  The vote of each justice is the basic unit of analysis for this study.
Each of these justice-votes was coded for the type of case, whether the outcome 
of the vote was considered to be liberal or conservative, and the theories of statutory 
interpretation employed (or criticized) in the opinion joined or written by that justice and 
whether that opinion was for the majority, a dissent or a concurrence.  This provides a 
database that enables examination of the relative effects of personal ideologies and 
interpretive theories on Supreme Court decisionmaking.  Cases were also coded by the 
year decided and the number of justices in the decisionmaking majority.  Appendix A 
provides greater detail on the coding methods for particular variables. Appendix B 
contains additional information through descriptive statistics about the nature of cases in 
the database.
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B. The Justices and Ideological Decisionmaking
Given the prior research, the effects of judicial ideology must be considered.  
Ideology may explain the results of my research, wholly independent of theories of 
statutory interpretation, and the exploration of the intersection of ideology and 
interpretive theories is also of crucial importance.  It may be important to separate out the 
cases where the decision was unanimous.  By their very nature, unanimous decisions do 
not appear to be ideologically driven.  If justices of very diverse political ideologies agree 
on an outcome, that result suggests that something other than ideology explains the 
outcome.  
The actual significance of unanimous decisions is unclear.  Some political 
scientists claim that these decisions can tell us nothing about ideological decisionmaking, 
hypothesizing that a unanimous decision simply reflects a case where a party’s ideology 
is beyond that of even the most extreme justice.  Thus, when Scalia or Thomas casts a 
liberal vote in a unanimous decision, it simply means that the conservative party took a 
position that was “too conservative” for Scalia or Thomas.  An alternative explanation for 
unanimous decisions, though, could be found in the constraining effect of the law.  A 
decision may be unanimous, because the law was so clear that a justice would be forced 
to reach a result that he or she might find ideologically undesirable.  Yet a third possible 
explanation is that the unanimous decisions occur in “cases which are of little interest –
politically, ideologically, or intellectually – to the Court,”272 and therefore not worth the 
trouble of writing a dissent.  These explanations are not exclusive – different unanimous 
decisions might be explained by different theories.  This article takes no preempirical 
position on the dispute, but considers results both including and excluding unanimous 
decisions of the Court.  Table 1 reports the ideological direction of the votes in the 
database for each of the justices.
TABLE 1
Percentage of Conservative Votes
Justice All Cases Non-Unanimous
Breyer 39.6% 34.4%
Ginsburg 40.2% 31.9%
Kennedy 62.8% 70.3%
O’Connor 68.9% 81.7%
Rehnquist 70.2% 82.4%
Scalia 71.4% 83.3%
Souter 45.8% 42.5%
Stevens 27.4% 14.1%
Thomas 76.5% 89.0%
272 The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1112.
The data demonstrate that ideology is an important factor in judicial outcomes, and the 
nature of these results conform fairly well to prior research and general expectations.  
Justice Stevens consistently votes for the liberal outcome, overwhelmingly so in non-
unanimous decisions.  Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas are similarly reliable 
conservative votes, particularly in non-unanimous holdings.  A somewhat surprising 
result is the degree of conservatism of Justice O’Connor in these statutory cases, as she is 
not so conservative in controverted constitutional decisions.  Other justices, especially 
Justice Souter, do not appear so consistently ideological in their votes, though this may 
only indicate that his ideology is a moderate one.
These results cast some doubt on the ability of the law to restrain the ideological 
inclinations of the judges in statutory interpretation actions.  If the law were consistently 
constraining, one would not see this pattern of ideological voting.  However, the results 
do not exclude the possibility that the law has some influence on the justices.  Even the 
most ideological of the justices occasionally vote contrary to their presumed preferences.  
The key to this study is ascertaining whether particular legal theories of statutory 
interpretation have a greater influence in constraining the justices.
C. The Justices and Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Analyzing statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court als requires some 
measure of the degree to which the justices consistently conform to a particular 
interpretive methodology.  As discussed above, Scalia is known for a devotion to 
textualism, while Breyer is dedicated to the theory of legislative intent.  Reputedly 
“Scalia is sufficiently committed to his views about legal method that he often declines to 
join other Justice’s opinions that employ improper methods.”273  Indeed, Scalia has on 
occasion concurred and simply declined to join a portion of an opinion relying on 
legislative history.274 However, he has also been called a “fallen textualist,” who fails to 
practice the theory “sincerely and consistently.”275  Both these claims are based only on 
anecdotal examples, though, as no empirical analysis has examined the extent to which 
the justices consistently adhere to particular approaches.  Table 2 presents a measure of 
the degree to which particular justices employ some of the major theories of statutory 
interpretation.  
To create measures for particular theories, I created new variables, combining the 
justices’ use of several variables.  Textualism (TEXT) is a new variable created from the 
combination of textualism, use of the plain meaning rule, use of dictionaries, use of 
common understanding of textual words, and use of the whole act rule.  Legislative intent 
(LEGINT) is created from the combination of a direct use of legislative history, reference 
to legislative history, finding of ambiguity in statutory text, reliance on congressional 
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inaction or reliance on congressional reenactment in interpretation.  CANON is a 
combination of reliance on any of the linguistic canons.  For each theory, each justice is 
given a score that indicates his or her use of that theory.276  I also created a variable for 
pragmatic interpretation (PRAGMA) as a combination of reliance on the absurdity 
doctrine and reliance on deference to the executive branch.277  Table 2 presents the 
measures for each of the justices and each of the general theories.
TABLE 2
Justices’ Use of Interpretive Theories
LEGINT TEXT CANON PRAGMA
Breyer 1.21 1.05 .02 .28
Ginsburg 1.18 1.21 .04 .25
Kennedy 1.03 1.30 .04 .13
O’Connor .76 1.34 .03 .18
Rehnquist .89 1.37 .03 .10
Scalia .45 1.44 .03 .06
Souter 1.20 1.18 .02 .22
Stevens 1.41 1.09 .03 .28
Thomas .57 1.44 .02 .05
The results are roughly as expected.  Breyer commonly relies on legislative intent, more 
than any justice other than Stevens, and Scalia is least likely to rely on legislative intent.  
Some might be surprised that Scalia has a positive score for legislative intent, but this is 
due to the fact that legislative intent includes more than simple reliance on legislative 
history and the fact that Scalia joined a few opinions that used legislative history, though 
he authored none.  All of the justices rely heavily on text for interpretation, though Scalia 
and Thomas use text somewhat more than Breyer and Stevens (the only two justices who 
deploy legislative intent more than textualism).  The more liberal justices tended to more 
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often invoke the approaches of pragmatism.  None of the justices rely heavily on the 
linguistic canons.  As expected, the canons may be no more than “tie-breakers” and are 
not particularly associated with the justices’ differential overarching interpretive theories.
These findings are again roughly consistent with the general reputation of the justices’ 
interpretive approaches.
At this point in the analysis, there appears to be a rough correlation between a 
justice’s ideology and his or her interpretive approach.  The more conservative judges 
tend to rely on the materials textualism, while more liberal judges are more willing to 
turn to external materials to discern the legislature’s intent.  To fully understand this 
association, though, requires consideration of the particular justices’ ideological 
preferences and how they integrate with the particular justices’ interpretive theories.
D. The Significance of Ideology and Theories of Statutory Interpretation
At this point of the analysis, I have shown that the justices are relatively 
predictable in the ideology of their voting patterns, though none of the justices are 
perfectly predictable.  Some justices have ideological tendencies, and they also show 
tendencies in their patterns of reliance on interpretive theories.  The next questions are 
whether justice ideology drives choice of interpretive theory, whether interpretive theory 
is the cause of ideological outcomes, or whether the two have discrete and separate 
impacts.
Before analyzing particular justice-votes, it is important to consider whether the 
theories of interpretation are themselves intrinsically ideologically oriented.278  Perhaps a 
given theory (e.g., textualism) naturally tends to produce particular ideological outcomes 
(e.g., conservative).  A particular theory may be chosen because it conduces to a pattern 
of desired outcomes.  This complicates the analysis.  If so, a justice might adopt a 
particular theory because it produced ideologically preferred results, but, alternatively, a 
justice’s predictable ideological pattern of results might simply be attributable to his or 
her devotion to a particular legal theory and say nothing about ideological voting.
As a preliminary test of the ideological effects of interpretive theories, all of the
individual statutory interpretation variables (listed in Appendix A) were entered as 
independent variables in a regression, with ideology as the dependent variable.  Table 3 
reports the results for those variables that met the .05 standard for statistical significance.
A positive sign reflects a liberal outcome effect, while a negative sign is conservative.  
The variables not included in the table were not statistically significant in their directional
effect.
278 See Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 2143 (noting that “elements of an 
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TABLE 3
Interpretive Approaches and Ideological Direction
Variable Coefficient Significance Level
Text Use .08 .01
Textualism -.11 .00
Plain Meaning .17 .00
Ambiguity .14 .00
Technical Meaning .13 .00
Absurdity -.07 .03
Legislative History .15 .00
Post Enactment .08 .01
Reenactment -.12 .00
Legislative Purpose .07 .05
Chevron .16 .00
Lenity .20 .00
Retroactivity -.12 .00
Noscitur .12 .00
These preliminary results do not present a clear picture of the ideological impact 
of interpretive theories.  Some of the results are as sometimes predicted – use of 
legislative history, legislative purpose, and finding ambiguity in language produced 
liberal results.  Other results, though are contrary to prediction.  While reference to
textualism was conservative, the express use of statutory text was associated with liberal 
results.  Just as one might expect, the canon against retroactive application of statutes 
tends to yield conservative results, while the rule of lenity tends to yield liberal outcomes.
Still other results seem to simply be inexplicable.  There is no apparent reason why the 
noscitur canon would be expected to yield significantly liberal results.  In part, these 
results may simply be the product of omitted third variables.  Moreover, when so many 
distinct independent variables are entered into a regression, statistical significance for the 
variables is much more likely, and particular findings may be a mere matter of chance
rather than a true association.
To reduce the number of independent variables in search of a true association, the 
same regression was run with the grouping of interpretive approaches into theories, as 
discussed above.279  Table 4 reports the results of this test.
279 See supra at _____.
TABLE 4
General Approaches and Ideological Direction
Coefficient Significance Level
LEGINT .121 .000
TEXT -.016 .589
CANON .047 .118
PRAGMA .132 .000
The groupings show some significant ideological effects of particular interpretive 
approaches.  Reference to legislative intent and pragmatism both had a significant 
directional effect, and both produced more liberal decisions.  Textualism proved more 
conservative but had no statistical significance in its effect.  From these results, it appears 
that interpretive theories have ideological implications, but these results are still too 
preliminary to draw any confident conclusions about their effects.
To understand the true effect of theories of statutory interpretation, additional 
analysis is required.  The intersection of statutory interpretation theories and judicial 
ideology must be considered.  There is no intrinsic reason why any of these theories 
should produce ideological results.  Legislative history may come from conservative
legislators, too.  The results reported in Table 4 may simply reflect a fact that liberal 
justices like to justify their rulings with legislative history, while conservative justices 
prefer to justify their rulings with express reliance on textualism and eschew any 
reference to legislative history.
The first test of theories of statutory interpretation involves judicial consensus.  
The current justices of the Supreme Court clearly have varied ideological preferences, as 
demonstrated by past research.  When these justices join together in a ruling, that may be 
evidence that their preferences are being constrained by legal rules, such as theories of 
statutory interpretation.280  As discussed above, a unanimous ruling might be explained 
by the presence of overwhelming legal arguments that overrode a justice’s ideological 
preferences.  Consequently, if a particular statutory interpretive approach tends to result 
in higher levels of judicial consensus, that would be evidence that this approach 
minimizes ideological decisionmaking through traditional rule of law values.
Conversely, an approach that produced dissensus might be one that permitted greater 
judicial ideological discretion.
Table 4 presents a regression of the theories of statutory interpretation and judicial 
consensus.  The dependent variable is simply the breakdown of the justice-votes in the 
case (e.g., a 7-2 decision is measured as .77, while a 5-4 decision is measured as .55).  In 
addition to the broad categories of interpretive theories used in Table 2, Table 4 reports 
the results, with coefficients and levels of statistical significance.
280 Of course, there are other, non-legal, explanations for higher levels of judicial consensus in 
particular cases.  See supra at ____.
TABLE 5
Interpretive Theories and Judicial Consensus
Coefficient Significance
LEGINT -.019 .558
TEXT .322 .747
CANON .032 .295
PRAGMA .095 .003
Of the interpretive theories, only pragmatism was significantly associated with greater 
Court consensus.  The invocation of legislative intent principles was found in cases with 
a lower degree of consensus, but textualism, legislative intent, and the canons had no 
statistically significant effect on consensus.  While this suggests that pragmatism may in 
fact be a neutral principle to constrain ideological decisionmaking and produce 
consensus, this test still lacks any direct ideological measure for the preferences of the 
justices.  Consequently, the results may not show an effect of law but simply the fact that 
more justices prefer pragmatic methods to others, causing these methods to capture more 
votes.
To incorporate the effect of the justices’ ideology, the next test incorporates 
quantitative measures of their ideology.  One measure is the set of Segal-Cover scores.281
These are ideological scores attached to justices based on press descriptions of their 
ideology at the time of their appointments.  The Segal-Cover ideological measures are 
widely used but may fail accurately to capture judicial ideology.  For example, they code 
Stevens as distinctly conservative based on press coverage at the time of his appointment 
by President Ford, though he is generally regarded as being quite liberal in his 
preferences, as confirmed by the data in this and other studies.
The Sirovich scores are a direct measure for justice ideology in the votes they 
cast.282 These scores are based on actual judicial voting and whether the justices tended 
to vote for liberal or conservative ends.  As such, their use might be criticized as circular, 
281 Segal-Cover scores were developed to quantitatively place the Supreme Court justices on an 
ideological scale.  See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989).  These scores are commonly used in 
analyses of Supreme Court voting.  See, e.g., Norm Violation by the Lower Courts in the Treatment of 
Supreme Court Precedent, supra note 000,  Richard C. Kearney & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court 
Decision Making:  The Impact of Court Composition on State and Local Government Litigation, 54 J. POL. 
1008 (1992); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian 
Institution?  The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 
(1993); Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, & Albert D. Cover, A Spatial Model of Roll Call Votiong:  
Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. (6 (1992); Michael W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the Supreme Court:  Cross Time 
Analyses of Criminal Procedure and Civil Rights Cases, 48 POL. RES. Q. 61 (1995).
282 The Sirovich scores of ideology are taken from the justices’ voting patterns.  See Lawrence 
Sirovich, A Pattern Analysis of the Second Rehnquist U.S. Supreme Court, 100 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 
7432 (2003).
using voting patterns as an independent variable to study the dependent variable of voting 
patterns.  However, they may better capture the true preferences of the justices, and the 
Sirovich scores are based on the full docket of the Court, including many constitutional 
decisions, while my data is limited to statutory interpretation decisions.  Because each set 
of ideology scores has its limitations, I ran separate regressions with each.  The 
dependent variable is the ideological outcome of the case.  Independent variables are each 
of the two measures for justice ideology, plus the interpretive theory variables from the 
preceding table.  Table 5 reports the results of two multiple regressions, using each of the 
measures for judicial ideology.
TABLE 6
Interpretive Theories and Judicial Outcomes
Segal-Cover Sirovich
Segal-Cover .166(.000)
Sirovich .302 (.000)
LEGINT .105 (.001) .078 (.009)
TEXT -.009 (.763) .007 (.808)
CANON .049 (.101) .048 (.102)
PRAGMA .121 (.000) .106 (.000)
Both measures for justice ideology are highly significant determinants of the ideology of 
the justice’s vote, with Sirovich being a much more powerful predictor and dwarfed the 
effect of any of the legal interpretive variables.  If votes were purely ideological, one 
would expect to find no statistical significance for any of the legal variables as 
determinants of outcomes.  If a legal variable has significance over and above the effect 
of ideology, that provides some evidence that its use causes justices to depart from their 
preferred ideology, with the associated implication that it serves to constrain judicial 
ideology.  While textualism is often invoked as an interpretive theory to constrain 
ideology, it did not have this effect.  The variable had no approximation of statistical 
significance.  The legislative intent and pragmatism variables, which are often criticized 
for expanding judicial discretion, actually showed statistically significant effect in 
constraining the effects of judicial ideology.  These results held for both measures of 
justice ideology. Rules of pragmatism also showed a constraining effect in the earlier test 
of Court consensus.
The significant effect of reliance on legislative intent tended to produce more
liberal decisions, but its independent statistical significance suggests that it was 
producing relatively liberal decisions from relatively conservative justices.  Those 
conservative justices were by no means compelled to resort to legislative intent to yield a 
liberal decision.  Rather, they may have been persuaded by the legislative history that 
Congress intended a result more liberal than the conservative justices might have 
preferred.  Of course, the external statistical analysis cannot reveal the internal thought 
process of the justices.  An inference from this finding, though, could be that determinate 
legislative history persuaded conservative justices that the correct statutory interpretation 
in a case was the more liberal one.  
There are some significant limitations to these findings that must be recognized.  
Both the choice of interpretive methods and outcome were within the control of the 
justices for each of the cases.283  Hence, it is possible that when a conservative judge 
actually preferred to reach a liberal result, they chose to use legislative history to reach 
that outcome.  The justices may simply choose the approach that best produces their 
desired outcomes.  In this case, legislative history would not have had any actual
constraining effect.284  In addition, because it is impossible to assign one “correct” 
decision to any particular case, these results cannot conclusively demonstrate that the use 
of legislative history (or pragmatism) had this effect of driving justices to moderate their 
ideology to reach the “correct” outcome.  The data do provide somewhat stronger 
evidence, though, that textualism is not constraining.  Hence, the claim that one should 
prefer textualism over legislative history as a means of constraint is more clearly refuted
by these results.
Perhaps the clearest and most important result of this analysis requires a broader 
perspective on the ideological consequences of doctrines.  There may be a meta-
ideological effect of interpretive regimes.  If legislative history systematically tends to 
yield more liberal results, even for more conservative judges, that result might explain the 
different approaches to interpretive theory.  The more conservative justices might have 
chosen to reject legislative history, not because it produces more ideological results but 
because it produces more liberal results.  And the more liberal justices might prefer use of 
legislative history for this same reason.  In this perspective, the fight over choices of 
interpretive doctrine is itself an ideological one, independent of the outcomes of 
particular cases.  The battle over interpretive theories, rather than over individual cases 
would therefore be the true ideological battleground.  Because Supreme Court decisions 
are more important in their precedential doctrinal effects than in their particular case 
outcome effects, this conclusion would suggest the importance of ideological 
decisionmaking and suggest that previous studies limited to the analysis of outcomes 
could even underestimate the role of ideology.
Conclusion
The empirical findings in this article cannot resolve the contested issues of 
statutory interpretation.  They cannot demonstrate that a particular purpose or particular 
method of statutory interpretation is preferable.  Nor can they validate or invalidate all of 
the arguments underlying the theoretical debate.  The findings are, however, essential to 
the evaluation of this contest.  The results offer strong evidence against one central claim 
of the textualists – that the strict textual approach to interpretation best constrains the 
283 In Howard and Segal’s study, supra note 000, the authors sought to avoid the problem of justice 
choice by examining the briefs of the parties and isolating cases where the justices were presented with 
only one interpretive theory to accept or reject.  A sampling of the cases in this database revealed that the 
briefs universally made both textual arguments and references to legislative intent.  Hence, it was 
impossible to separate cases in which the justices had only one interpretive theory to accept or reject.
284 The fact that the more moderately conservative justices were the most likely to use legislative 
history is consistent with this suggestion.
ideological inclinations of the justices.285 In fact, reliance on textualism showed no 
constraining effect, once justice ideology was accounted for.  By contrast, legislative 
intent and pragmatism demonstrated some such effect, even after controlling for justice 
ideology.
One of the most important, if not the most important, principles in the debate over 
methodologies of statutory interpretation has been the need to cabin judicial discretion 
with law.  This argument has been most frequently deployed by textualists arguing 
against use of legislative history, and their contention may have become the conventional 
wisdom of today.  This wisdom, though, has been supported only by intuition rather than 
rigorous analysis.  This quantitative empirical analysis of Supreme Court decisionmaking 
shows the conventional wisdom to be  potentially backwards – that textualism does not 
constrain judicial ideology but the use of legislative intent and pragmatism may be 
constraining.  The results show that textualism is not an effective tool for moderating 
willful ideological decisionmaking in the Supreme Court. Of course, if it is true that the 
theories have distinct ideological implications of their own, it is possible that none of the 
theories cabin ideology and that the choice of theories is simply another front in the 
ideological battle.
Far too often, the debate over statutory interpretation relies upon factual 
presuppositions that lack any rigorous support.  This is traditionally the case with those 
who seek to constrain willful ideological judging.  This empirical analysis sheds some 
light on the issue and the effect of interpretive tools on outcomes, independent of 
ideology.  As is the case with any preliminary study, the reader should not take the 
findings as conclusive.  Additional research on the matter, using more and different cases, 
with different sets of justices is important.  Research on the effect of these doctrines on 
lower courts would also be extremely valuable. The latter study would greatly illuminate 
whether interpretive theories are chosen for the ideological implications of their 
precedential doctrinal effects.
285 This concern for constraint of judicial discretion has been called the “obsessive desire” of the new 
textualists.  See Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process, supra note 000, at 830.
APPENDIX A
Variables and Coding
The data in this study involved coding Supreme Court decisions between 1994 and 2002.  
The vote of each individual justice was separately coded for variables including method 
of statutory interpretation, type of case, and ideological direction of the vote.
The statutory interpretation variables that were coded included:
Text Use – Was the text of the statute used in the opinion?
Textualism – Did the opinion make explicit reference to textualism?
Plain Meaning – Did the opinion expressly invoke the plain meaning rule?
Ambiguity – Did the opinion find the statutory language to be ambiguous?
Dictionary – Was a dictionary used to ascertain the meaning of statutory text?
Common Understanding – Did the opinion use common understanding of meaning?
Technical Understanding – Did the opinion use technical understanding of meaning?
Whole Act – Did the opinion invoke the whole act rule?
Absurdity – Did the opinion find an interpretation of text to be absurd?
Legislative History – Did the opinion use legislative history for statutory meaning?
Conference Committee – Was the legislative history from a conference committee?
Other Committee – Was the legislative history from an non-conference committee?
Sponsor – Was the legislative history a sponsor statement?
Other – Was the legislative history some other aspect of the record (e.g., hearing)?
President – Did the opinion use a presidential statement for statutory meaning?
Post Enactment – Did the opinion use post -enactment legislative history?
Congressional Inaction – Did the opinion use congressional inaction for interpretation?
Reenactment – Did the opinion rely on a statute’s reenactment for interpretation?
Legislative Purpose – Did the opinion use legislative purpose for interpretation?
Chevron Deference – Did the opinion use Chevron deference?
Expressio – Did the opinion use the expressio canon?
Ejusdam – Did the opinion use the ejusdam canon?
Noscitur – Did the opinion use the noscitur canon?
Common Law – Did the opinion use the common law canon?
Federalism – Did the opinion use the federalism canon?
Constitutional avoidance – Did the opinion use the constitutional avoidance canon?
Lenity – Did the opinion use the rule of lenity canon?
For each of these variables, a justice vote was coded as “1” if it affirmatively used the 
interpretive principle, “0” if it made no mention of the principle, and “-1” if it rejected the 
use of the principle in interpretation.  Rejection could take the form of either the rejection 
of the validity of the interpretive standard as a general matter or the rejection of its value 
in the particular case.
Decisions were also coded for case type and for the ideological direction of the opinion.  
The case type codes were:  (a) criminal, (b) civil rights, (c) first amendment, (d) due 
process, (e) privacy, (f) labor, (g) other economic activity and regulation, (h) civil 
procedure, and (i) miscellaneous.  Ideological coding was based on the identity of the 
parties and their litigation positions.  In criminal cases, a decision for the defendant was 
coded as liberal and one for the government as conservative.  In civil rights cases, a 
decision for a minority or female was liberal, and a decision against such parties was 
conservative.  A decision for application of the first amendment or due process or privacy 
rights was coded as liberal and the contrary was conservative.  A decision for a labor 
union was coded liberal and a ruling for business in a labor dispute was conservative.  A 
decision for government in regulation was liberal while a decision in favor of a regulated 
entity was coded as conservative.  A decision for a tort plaintiff was coded liberal, and a 
ruling for a defendant was conservative.  In cases including civil procedure disputes, a 
ruling for an “underdog” was coded as liberal, where this could be readily categorized.
A few cases could not be clearly coded under these principles and were excluded.  For 
some other cases, the ideological coding is debatable.  For example, the database 
included criminal cases involving violation of a gun possession law.  A decision for the 
defendant in such an action was coded liberal but is arguably an ideologically 
conservative decision.  To avoid the risk of introducing researcher bias, though, the 
traditional coding was used.  To the extent that this coding was erroneous, it will tend to 
understate the effect of ideology on judicial decisionmaking.
The cases were also coded by year of decision, number of justices in the majority, and 
whether the justice in question was a dissenter or concurrer and whether the justice 
authored the opinion containing the statutory interpretation analysis.
APPENDIX B
Descriptive Statistics
This appendix provides summary data on the cases included in the database analyzed in 
this study.  This data may be valuable in assessing the representativeness of the cases 
analyzed and for future research.  This appendix provides the necessary data on the types 
of cases contained in the database, the relative frequency with which the justices 
employed particular tools of statutory interpretation or affirmatively rejected those tools,
the relative number of justice-votes in each year of the database,
TABLE B1
Case Types in Database
Casetype Frequency
Criminal 25.7%
Civil Rights 11.3%
First Amendment 2.5%
Due Process 0.8%
Privacy 0.8%
Labor 9.0%
Economic 29.0%
Civil Procedure 6.9%
Miscellaneous 13.8%
TABLE B2
Use of Statutory Interpretation Methodologies
Mean Negative Positive
Textualism 1.09 6.0% 64.2%
Legislative History .88 13.6% 56.8%
Canons
.05 7.0% 11.0%
Pragmatism .15 9.7% 22.5%
TABLE B3
Number of Votes by Year
Frequency
1994 13.8%
1995 13.3%
1996 6.6%
1997 9.2%
1998 11.8%
1999 9.7%
2000 11.3%
2001 10.8%
2002 13.5%
